Charter Commission

City of Portland Charter Commission Agenda March 23, 2022 at 6:00 PM Due to the existence of an "emergency or urgent issue", the Charter Commission & its Committees will conduct meetings by remote methods/technology at the Zoom link provided below, in accordance with the requirements of 1 M.R.S. section 403 -B and the Charter Commission Remote Participation Policy. Allow your computer to install the free Zoom app to get the best meeting experience. If you are not able to attend live, a recording will be available following the meeting in our Agenda Portal. For public comment, you will need to use the "raise your hand" feature. To raise your hand via the telephone, please hit *9. You will be unmuted by the host when it is time for public comment. 1. Zoom Information a. This meeting will be held remotely pursuant to the Remote Meeting Policy adopted by the Charter Commission and as authorized under 1 M.R.S. 403-B because of the existence of an emergency or urgent issue that requires the committee to meet by remote methods. Allow your computer to install the free Zoom app to get the best meeting experience. If you are not able to attend live, a recording will be available following the meeting. For public comment, you will need to use the “raise your hand” feature. To raise your hand via the telephone, please use *9. You will be unmuted by the host when it is time for public comment. Please click the link below to join the webinar: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/81506694378?pwd=Z1J1OUQyTXJGenNvaGFqd0E4d213dz09 Passcode: 590888 Or One tap mobile : US: +13017158592,,81506694378#,,,,*590888# or +13126266799,,81506694378#,,,,*590888# Or Telephone: Dial(for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location): US: +1 301 715 8592 or +1 312 626 6799 or +1 646 558 8656 or +1 253 215 8782 or +1 346 248 7799 or +1 720 707 2699 Webinar ID: 815 0669 4378 Passcode: 590888 International numbers available: https://us06web.zoom.us/u/keCWkF2OPL Page 1 2. Call to Order (6:00-6:05 pm) 3. Review and Approval of Draft March 16, 2022 Meeting Minutes (6:05-6:10 pm) a. Approval of the March 16, 2022 Draft Meeting Minutes. 4. Deliberation on Governance Models (6:10-7:50 pm) a. Description: Commissioners will deliberate on reforms to the basic structure of Portland's government. Relevant document(s). a. Commissioner Sheikh-Yousef's governance model proposal b. Governance Committee's governance model proposal c. Matrix comparison of two models d. Commissioner Barowitz's organizational charts e. Commissioner Chann's organizational chart f. Commissioner O'Brien's governance model g. Relevant research and interviews Break 7:50-8:30 Public Hearing, Deliberations, and vote on Clean Elections proposal from Elections 5. Committee (7:50-8:30) a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on the Clean elections proposal from the Elections Committee Relevant document(s) a. Clean elections proposal b. Cost Estimate c. Memo from James Katsiaficas Public Hearing, Deliberations and vote on Redistricting proposal from Elections 6. Committee (8:30-8:55 pm). a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on a Council Redistricting proposal. Relevant document(s). a. Council District Proposal b. Council Structure Data c. LWV City Council Makeup d. NLC-Cities 101 e. The Trade offs between At Large and Single member districts f. The Effect of At- large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities g. The Context Matters: The effects of Single member versus At-large districts on City Council Diversity h. Memo from James Katsiaficas Public Hearing, Deliberations, and vote on Code of Ethics proposal from Procedures 7. Committee (9:00-9:30 pm) a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliverate and vote on a Code of Ethics proposal. Page 2  Relevant document(s). a. Proposal on Code of Ethics Public Hearing, Deliberations and vote on Participatory Budgeting Proposal from 8. Procedures Committee (9:30-10:00) a. Description: Commissioners will hold a public hearing, then deliberate and vote on a Participatory Budgeting proposal. b. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying questions on an amended school budget process. There will be no vote on this proposal. Relevant document(s) a. Proposal for school budget process First Read of School Budget Process Proposal from Education Committee (10:00-10:05 9. pm) a. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying questions on an amended capital improvement program process. There will be no vote on this proposal. Relevant document (s) a. Proposal for school budget process First Read of Capital Improvement Program Process Proposal from Education Committee 10. (10:05-10:10 pm). a. Description: members of the Education Committee will present and field clarifying questions on an amendment capital improvement program process. There will be no vote on this proposal. Relevant document(s): a. Proposal for capital improvement program process 11. First Read on Revised Governance Proposal a. Revised Governance Proposal 12. New Business 13. Adjourn Page 3 DRAFT City of Portland Charter Commission Meeting Minutes March 16, 2022 (Remote via Zoom) 1. Zoom Information The meeting was conducted as a remote meeting by Zoom videoconference in accordance with the Commission’s Remote Participation Policy and State law (1 M.R.S. §403-B). 2. Call to Order Chair Kebede called the meeting to order at 6:00 p.m. Commissioners present were Barowitz, Chann, Eglinton, Houston, Kebede, Lizanecz, O’Brien, Sheikh-Yousef, Stewart-Bouley, Washburn, and Waxman; Commissioner Buxton, absent. (Quorum established) 3. Review and Approval of Minutes On motion by Commissioner Eglinton, seconded by Commissioner Waxman, the Commission voted to approve the draft meeting minutes of March 9, 2022 by roll-call vote of 11-0. 4. Deliberation on Governance Models Commissioners deliberated on reforms to the basic structure of Portland’s government. Two facilitators, Samaa Abdurragib and Hilary North-Ellasante, guided the Commissioners’ discussion. The Commissioners took a series of non-binding straw poll votes to assess the level of consensus for various elements of a governance model. a. Mayor as City’s Chief Executive Officer. Chair Kebede began the discussion by moving that the Commission take a straw poll vote as to whether the Chief Executive Officer of the City of Portland is its elected Mayor and that Portland has a chief administrative officer, seconded by Commissioner Washburn. He explained this was a way to establish consensus on a basic topic and to enable further discussion. Commissioner O’Brien asked to clarify that the straw poll vote was as to whether the City’s chief executive officer should be the mayor or a city manager, and Commissioner Kebede agreed this was the effect of the question. Commissioner Chann sought to add that the Mayor would have oversight over and the support of the city manager or another person with professional managerial and financial expertise, to have assurance that there {P1998513.1} 1 Page 4 DRAFT would be professional management; after discussion, the vote on the motion proceeded without amendment. As to whether to hold the straw poll vote, the motion passed by vote of 10-1 (O’Brien). As to the straw poll vote on whether the Chief Executive Officer of the City of Portland is its elected Mayor and that Portland has a chief administrative officer, the Commissioners voted 7 yes (Kebede, Washburn, Barowitz, Lizanecz, Sheikh- Yousef, Houston, and Chann) and 4 no (Eglinton, O’Brien, Stewart-Bouley, and Waxman). b. Mayor’s Powers. Commissioner O’Brien stated that to him, the big question is unilateralism – can the mayor act unilaterally, without council ratification or vote, and when? The Commissioners then began reviewing the potential powers of an executive mayor. 1) Hiring and Firing. Commissioner Lizanecz moved for a straw vote poll that the executive mayor be granted authority to unilaterally hire and fire City staff; Commissioner O’Brien seconded. Commissioner Washburn preferred such authority be limited to department heads only, since staff are subject to union agreements or are subject to the civil service system and personnel policies. Commissioner Barowitz wanted to exempt from the motion the mayor’s unilateral authority to hire the mayor’s own staff, such as a chief of staff, political director, and constituent services person – to be able to hire/fire trusted advisors. After refinement by Commissioners Washburn and Lizanecz, the motion was to take a straw poll vote whether the mayor shall not be granted unilateral authority to hire and fire department heads and the city manager. As to whether to hold the straw poll vote, the motion passed by vote of 10- 1 (Sheikh-Yousef). As to the straw poll vote on whether the mayor shall not be granted unilateral authority to hire and fire department heads and the city manager, the Commissioners voted 9 yes (Kebede, Eglinton, Barowitz, Lizanecz, O’Brien, Stewart-Bouley, Waxman, Houston, and Chann) and 2 no (Washburn, Sheikh- Yousef). 2) Prepare Budget. Commissioner Sheikh-Yousef moved for a straw vote poll that the executive mayor be granted authority to draft/prepare the City’s annual budget; Commissioner Washburn seconded. The Commissioners voted 8 yes (Kebede, Washburn, Sheikh-Yousef, Barowitz, Lizanecz, Stewart-Bouley, Houston, and Chann) and 3 no (Eglinton, Waxman, O’Brien) to approve the motion. 3) Date of Mayor’s Election. Commissioner Barowitz noted that the mayor currently s elected in an off-year election, and suggested there would be more voter interest and participation in that election if it were held in a presidential election year. Therefore, he moved for a straw vote poll that the election of the executive mayor be held in a presidential election year; Commissioner Houston seconded. The Commissioners voted 9 yes (Kebede, Washburn, Sheikh-Yousef, Eglinton, Barowitz, Lizanecz, Stewart-Bouley, Houston, and Chann) and 2 no (Waxman, O’Brien) to approve the motion. 5. First read of Redistricting proposal from Elections Committee Members of the Elections Committee presented and fielded clarifying questions on a Council Redistricting proposal. There was no vote on this proposal. {P1998513.1} 2 Page 5 DRAFT Commissioner Chann presented the Elections Committee proposal, which features a 13-member City Council, with 10 district seats and 3 at-large seats. The Council members would elect a chair or president. He explained that an odd number of councilors was chosen to avoid tie votes, and that the increase in numbers of councilors is intended to better align issues and districts for more effective representation. He, Commissioner Washburn, and the Commission recognize the ongoing issues political scientists report in the literature, with at- large seats promoting gender equality and district seats promoting racial and ethnic diversity, and they decided to bring these issues to the Commission to resolve. Commissioner Stewart- Bouley asked about the possibility of a Peaks Island council seat; however, given the population of the Island, the population of Portland and the one person-one vote constitutional requirement, it appears that doing so would require many more councilors to accomplish. Commissioners asked about how districts currently are determined and what legal standards apply, and Chair Kebede asked if increases in City Council district seats necessarily require an increase in School Board seats – the commission’s legal advisor will respond. 6. New Business Chair Kebede shared a document from the City’s Finance Director showing that the Commission to date has spent approximately $36,500 of its $75,000 budget. Several Commissioners inquired whether the legal fees should be counted in that budget, and the Chair said he would investigate. The Executive Committee will obtain quotes on the cost of outside legal counsel to provide an opinion and the required final report letter on the Universal Resident Voting proposal. 7. Adjourn On motion by Commissioner Sheikh-Yousef, seconded by Commissioner Houston, the Commission voted to adjourn by roll-call vote of 11-0. Meeting adjourned at 10:22 p.m. {P1998513.1} 3 Page 6  City of Portland, Maine Charter Commission GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE WORK PLAN ELECTION OF OFFICERS & DEVELOPMENT OF WORK PLAN September 8, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=39849 Minutes: https://tinyurl.com/minutes-sept-8 VALUES MAPPING & DESIRED OUTCOMES September 22, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=40131 Notes about Values: https://tinyurl.com/commission-values ● With facilitator David Plumb MAYORS INTERVIEWS October 13, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=40566 Notes from Mayors interviews: https://tinyurl.com/mayor-interviews ● Kate Snyder ● Michael Brennan ● Panel of Jill Duson, Jim Cohen, and Karen Geraghty ● Ethan Strimling EXPERTS INTERVIEWS November 8, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41035 Notes from Expert interviews: https://tinyurl.com/expert-interviews ● Dr. Chyrl Laird, recent Government professor at Bowdoin, now at U Maryland ● Dominick Pangallo, Chief of Staff in Salem, MA ● Dr. Jim Svara, UNC researcher/editor of 4th ed. of National Civic League's Model City Charter Page 7 MANAGERS INTERVIEWS November 10, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41102 Notes from Manager interviews: https://tinyurl.com/manager-interviews ● Joe Gray, former City Manager of Portland ● Tanisha Briley, City Manager in Gaithersburg, MD; formerly in Columbus Heights, OH ● Kevin Sutherland, ex Chief of Staff in Ithaca, ex City Administrator in Saco, finalist for City Manager in Bar Harbor ● Sheila Hill-Christian, former Acting City Manager in Portland ● Note: Jon Jennings was invited but formally declined CITY COUNCILORS INTERVIEWS November 29, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41552 Notes from Councilor interviews: https://tinyurl.com/council-interviews ● Belinda Ray, 2015-2021 ● David A. Marshall, 2006-2015 ● Pious Ali, 2016-present ● Kimberly Cook, 2017-2020 LEADERSHIP MODEL DELIBERATIONS December 8, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41743 Notes from deliberations: https://tinyurl.com/deliberation-notes ● With facilitator David Plumb Page 8 Commissioner O'Brien Leadership Model THE VOTERS PLAN PROS Least fiscal impact ELECT THE LEGISLATIVE ARM Council retains most control over fiscal impact Mayor's powers/duties/influence strengthened and clarified CITY COUNCIL MAYOR Allows Mayor to develop policy proposals in public 9 Districts President of the Council Allows Mayor to oversee management of the city 2 At-Large Votes only in case of a tie Prevents the Mayor from acting unilaterally At-Large/Mayor run as ticket; Appoints Council committees Does not isolate Mayor from Council Individual councilors may Directs draft City Budget Prevents potential Mayor-Council President power clash introduce proposal(s) for vote; Issues Council agendas in compliance with Council rules Reduces Manager-Council bypassing the Mayor Individual councilor may Advises and consents to Manager's department head nominations before vote by Council Reduces Manager's influence on Council sponsor public proposal Meets regularly with Manager re: Council policy implementation/coordinate messaging/ID lobbying needsReduces Manager's role in policy development for vote by council rules; Participates in Councilor-Manager meetings (eg, committee chairs meet periodically with manager) Allows for more change agents: mayor, councilors, and public Holds public hearing for Chairs Manager's Annual Review / May call executive session of Council to discuss performance Eliminates duplication/confusion of managerial powers referendum campaigns Sits on City's Economic Development Team Reduces gatekeeping of city services/information May form public task force by right with staffing support for any issue not taken up by Council Provides way for mayor/council/public to examine gov't conduct Portland's lobbyist in Augusta/Washington Reduces costs/effort to run at-large by running as a ticket Official spokesperson for City and Council Reduces "mandate" conflict between mayor/at-large councilors Reduces number of councilors competing on ballot for mayor OVERSEE CITY OFFICES Mayor elected with two allies on Council CITY MANAGER OFFICE OF INFORMATION CITY CLERK CORP. COUNSEL Communications Constituent Services FOIA Requests Meeting Noticing Councilor requests for docs/clarifying questions for staff (according to council rules) STAFFS REVIEW BOARDS OVERSIGHT COMMISSION CIVILIAN POLICE REVIEW BOARD Renders advisory opinions to Council by request on: As detailed in independent proposal Adherence to Rules / Procedures / Ordinances / Charter Offers Second Legal Opinions by request Offers Second Opinions on Conflict of Interest by request Evaluates Program Delivery & Effectiveness by request Receives Annual Finance Audit Report, Forwards to Council Receives & Refers Malfeasance Complaints, Reviews How Handled Receives & Refers Whistleblower Complaints, Reviews How Handled Staff research support by Office of Information Staff report writing support by Corporation Counsel's Office May request funding from Council for independent investigators Mayor may submit formal requests Council may submit requests by majority vote Two councilors may submit formal requests Staff may submit whistleblower complaints Public may submit formal requests by signature thresholds 7 members appointed by council 3-year terms, 3 terms max At least 3 volunteer attorneys as members on commission 3/4/2022 Page 9  CHANN/LIZANECZ/STEWART-BOULEY TWO-BRANCH COMPROMISE FRAMEWORK EXECUTIVE + ADMINISTRATION LEGISLATIVE + OVERSIGHT ELECTED OFFICIALS MAYOR POLICY COUNCIL Can propose policies to Council, gives State of City Address Elects Chairperson Prepares and presents City Budget Any councilor can propose policy Oversees implementation of policies set by Council, City Votes on and adopts City Budget Manager, and implementation of City Budget Provides oversight of City Executive, Constitutional Officers, Can be removed by 2/3 majority of Council and Administration on behalf voters through Ombudsman EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS Joint Exec/Leg Committee Nominates, Council Confirms and Appoints Reports to Join Exec/Leg Committee Recommends Dismissal, Council Confirms Dismissal Reports to CITY ATTORNEY CITY MANAGER Advises Mayor and Council OMBUDSMAN and represents the City in legal matters Supports Mayor in managing Assists the Council in providing implementation of policies set by Council Constituent Services and implementation of City Budget CITY CLERK Coordinates fulfillment of FOIA and Manages day-to-day operations of the city information requests and oversees department heads and staff Manages scheduling, notice, Investigates complaints and reports to Supports Mayor in preparation of City public meetings Ethics Commission or Council for actiom Budget; oversees and coordinates preparation of departmental budgets Manages and oversees Enforces conflicts of interest policies and elections ordinances CITY ADMINISTRATION CITY BOARD & COMMITTEES Joint Exec/Leg Committee Nominates Department Heads, Council Confirms and Appoints Joint Exec/Leg Committee Nominates Appointments, Council Confirms and Appoints Department Heads manage hiring and firing of staff; no unilateral hiring/firing by Mayor FIRE DEPARTMENT POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICE REVIEW BOARD PERMITTING & INSPECTIONS PLANNING AND URBAN DEV HISTORIC PRESERVATION RENT BOARD HOUSING & ECONOMIC DEV SUSTAINABILITY OFFICE PLANNING BOARD ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS ADMINISTRATION CDBG ALLOCATION COMM. PORTLAND DEV CORP OVERSIGHT RENTAL HOUSING ADVISORY HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES CONTINUUM OF CARE EMERGENCY SHELTER DISABILITY ADVISORY PUBLIC WORKS JETPORT PARKS COMMISSION SOUND OVERSIGHT PARKING PARKS & RECREATION PUBLIC ART COMMITTEE PESTICIDE MANAGEMENT LAND BANK COMMISSION ASSESSOR HUMAN RESOURCES ASSESSMENT REVIEW CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FINANCE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY Page 10  Portland's Current Distribution of Powers & Authority Compared to Proposals for Change Powers & Authority Current Portland Charter Governance Committee Proposal Shiekh-Yousef Proposal 1) Who is the Chief Executive Officer? City Manager City Manager Mayor City Council; Mayor has special right to City Council; Mayor can propose policy 2) Who has policy making authority? City Council form staffed public task force on policy to Council, which would be required to not taken up by Council Committee. consider and vote on it. 3) Who oversees policy City Manager City Manager Mayor implementation? City Administator, City Clerk, 4) Who are the top city officials?(note City Manager, City Clerk, Corporation City Manager, City Clerk, Corporation Corporation Counsel, Public Advocate 1) Counsel Counsel, Chief of Staff (note 2) (note 3) Mayor chairs committee with at least 2 Public Advocate is elected. Clerk and other Council members to nominate 5) What is the process for filling top Same as current for City Manager, Clerk, Counsel nominated by Public Advocate. City Manager, Clerk, and Corporate city official positions Counsel, and Chief of Staff Administrator nominated by Mayor. Counsel. Council confirms by majority Council confirms all by majority vote. vote. Public Advocate may recommend removal of City Clerk or Corporate Mayor-chaired 3 person Council 6) What is the process for removing top Counsel; Council must approve with Committee may recommend removal; No change city officials 2/3rds vote. City Administrator serves Council approves by majority vote. at will of the Mayor. Public Advocate may be removed by citizen's recall. 7) Who manages day to day operations City Administrator under direct City Manager City Manager of city affairs? supervision of Mayor City Manager nominates, Council Mayor nominates, Council approves; 8) How are Department Heads approves. Heads serve at will of the City no change department heads serve at will of the hired/supervised/ removed? Manager. Mayor. Page 11 Powers & Authority Current Portland Charter Governance Committee Proposal Shiekh-Yousef Proposal Mayor is not a member. Council elects 9) Is mayor a member of Council? If yes, Mayor is voting member and chairs the no change its own President from amongst its does mayor have a vote? Council. members. 10) Who Creates and Appoints Mayor, but council may override with President of Council can create no change members to Council Committees? 2/3 vote. committees and appoint members. 11) Who appoints members of city PA nominates; Council approves/ Council no change boards and commissions? rejects by majority vote. 12) Who has authority for preparing/ City Manager prepares with "guidance" Mayor prepares with assistance from Mayor prepares with assistance of approving Municipal Budget from Mayor; Council approves. Manager; Council approves. Administrator; Council approves. Mayor prepares with School Board School Board/Superintendent with 13) Who has authority for preparing/ Chair and Superintendent; School guidance from Council; approval by no change approving School Budget? Board approves and sends to voters; no Council and then by voters. Council vote. Yes Override 14) Can Mayor veto the municipal Yes; 75% majority needed to override requires 6 (of 8) votes. Mayor does not No budget approved by the Council? veto. vote. Yes -- full veto power over all policies, 15) Can Mayor veto other Council No No ordinances, orders, expenditures, etc.; decisions? Council requires 75% vote to override. 16) How long does the Mayor serve in 4 years, corresponding with 4 years 4 years office? Presidential election years 17) Are their mayoral term limits? 3 terms 3 terms 2 terms 18) Can Mayor be removed before term Via citizens' recall Via citizens' recall Via citizens' recall is over? Page 12 Powers & Authority Current Portland Charter Governance Committee Proposal Shiekh-Yousef Proposal Charter Arbitration Panel (note 4) and required City Council hearing for Referendum Advocates (note 5). 19) Have new powers/authority been Not applicable Council required to develop procedures None proposed for non-city officials through which citizens may formally propose policies for council consideration (note 6). Notes: 1) For purposes of this chart, current top city officials (other than mayor) include the city manager/administrator, city clerk, and corporate counsel as these are often in a town's Charter. New top positions proposed include a Chief of Staff and a Public Advocate. 2) Duties of proposed Chief of Staff: coordinate Council staffing need; receive and track constituent services and FOIA requests; post notices of city meetings and post all materials. 3) Duties of proposed Public Advocate: serve as independent ombudsman to improve city government. Provide outside review of city agencies, investigate citizen complaints, and make proposals for improvement to Mayor and Council. Respond to FOIA requests. Serves as Mayor in case of vacancy or incapacity of elected Mayor. 4) Arbitration panel will convene when called to act by City Council to interpret Charter language and provide a formal decision. Panel to consist of 3 members from previous Charter Commission. 5) When a referendum campaign has collected 2/3 of the required signatures, City Council will be required to hold a public hearing. Page 13 Structural Examination of Systems of City Government A Visual Representation of the Elements of City Government Submitted by Zack Barowitz, D3 Page 14  One Branch Defining Characteristics 1) Council has all executive, legislative, and oversight powers. 2) Mayor is head of Council, sets meeting agendas, and typically has some other legislative powers no other council member has. 3) All (most) executive powers delegated by Council to an appointed City Manager Often Cited Advantages of this form a) Executive decisions are made by a professionally trained expert in city management b) CEO is not influenced by political considerations relating to his/her own electoral interests c) CEO devotes more time to administrative functions including policy implementation than to policy development d) No interbranch divisiveness and maximal congruence between policy development and policy implementation Often Cited Disadvantages of this form a) CEO is not accountable to the voters, a fundamental disconnect with the principle that government decision-makers should be accountable to the people they serve. b) No direct incentive for CEO to be responsive to individual citizen or interest group concerns c) Little to no incentive for meaningful oversight of government agencies, programs, and policies or individual behavior of corporate officers Page 15  One Branch + Elected Oversight Defining Characteristics 1) Single branch for legislative & administrative 2) Oversight branch has investigatory and advisory powers but not adjudicative ones Often-cited Advantages of this form a) Branch dedicated to government oversight will lead to more comprehensive investigation and reporting of how city government is functioning b) Independence of oversight branch reduces influence of other government officials in determination of what is investigated/researched, what recommendations are made, and what final reports actually say c) Independent branch dedicated to reviewing operations of city government is best place to house “ombudsman” providing non-judicial recourse for citizens dissatisfied with executive and/or legislative branch decisions Often-cited Disadvantages a) Single branch gives less authority to elected officials Page 16  Two Branches Defining Characteristics 1) Separate branches for executive and legislative functions 2) Mayor not a member of the Council Often Cited Advantages of this form a) Leaders responsible for executive and legislative functions are directly accountable to voters b) Leaders of both branches have electoral incentives to be responsive to individual citizens and interest groups c) Checks and balances between both branches, including legislative branch oversight of city agencies, are typically built-in Often Cited Disadvantages a) CEO (Mayor) typically has little to no city management experience b) Potential politicization of city services c) Interbranch divisiveness has tendency to develop Page 17  Three Branches Defining Characteristics 3) Separate branches for executive, legislative, and government oversight functions, each with elected leaders 4) Oversight branch has investigatory and advisory powers but not adjudicative ones 5) Public Advocate position tends to be breeding ground for individuals with ambitions for higher office Often-cited Advantages of this form d) Branch dedicated to government oversight will lead to more comprehensive investigation and reporting of how city government is functioning e) Independence of oversight branch reduces influence of other government officials in determination of what is investigated/researched, what recommendations are made, and what final reports actually say f) Independent branch dedicated to reviewing operations of city government is best place to house “ombudsman” providing non-judicial recourse for citizens dissatisfied with executive and/or legislative branch decisions Often-cited Disadvantages b) Additional branch increases likelihood of interbranch divisiveness Page 18  Evaluation of the systems based on goals, values, and anticipated outcomes. Because values are more easily agreed upon than methods, I think a consideration of goals is a good place to start. My current thinking on structure of government is to test various models against various values, goals, and expected outcomes.These could include: ● Responsiveness of government to constituent needs–and to change, innovation, and unexpected events ● Efficient administration ● Provide avenues for public recourse ● Transparent oversight/daylight to minimize waste, fraud, and abuse ● Empower the legislative/elected body ● Mitigate red tape ● Increase public participation NB: This is presented for the sake of illustration not necessarily as a methodological framework. Example: Current System Enhanced One Branch (One One w/elected Two Branches: Thee Elected Branches: Branch) Branch oversight Council-Mayor Council-Mayor-Oversight Efficient Admin Empowered Elected Officials Public/Transparent Oversight Avenues for Public Recourse Cost Page 19 Proposed Process for Commission Decision Making 1) Using the above charts, commissioners discuss how many branches Portland’s government should have 2) At the end of discussion, a straw-vote is taken on the above question. 3) After straw vote is taken, the Powers/Authority Matrix is used to flesh out the specific powers of the officers in whichever government form has won the most votes. A “Commission Proposal” Column has been added to the previous Matrix to facilitate this “fleshing out”. All of the cells in that column are currently blank. Some will be filled in as a result of the above straw-vote (i.e., who is the CEO? And who manages day-to-day operations of city staff?). The Commissioners will then proceed (row by row) to decide how to complete each unfilled cell in the Commission Proposal Column, picking from what’s been proposed in the other columns for each row or coming up with some other option entirely. After discussing all the options for each row, further straw-votes would be taken on what goes into each blank cell. 4) After all cells are completed on a straw-vote basis, the Commissioners would then take a final vote on what is contained in the Commission Proposal column as a whole. Presumably some commissioners may disagree with how some of the cells have been completed, but they may still decide to vote in favor of the Commission Proposal as a whole. Note: To speed up the process described in (3) above, one idea is to give each commissioner their own matrix and have them complete each blank cell themselves. Then all the individual responses could be tabulated (anonymously) to see how much agreement or disagreement there is in terms of each cell. Cells where there is substantial disagreement would (presumably) be the place where discussion and debate would begin. [NB: This process in particular, and much of the work on this document generally, was developed by Valerie Kelly and Phil Steele, who worked in close collaboration with Cmsr. Barowitz.] Page 20  CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE CHARTER COMMISSION GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE CITY LEADERSHIP MODEL RECOMMENDATIONS January 11, 2022 PURPOSE This report serves to summarize the activities and recommendations of the Portland Charter Commission’s Governance Committee in its objective to propose structural changes to the leadership model of Portland’s municipal government. COMPOSITION The Governance Committee comprises four members of the Portland Charter Commission: • Robert O’Brien, Chair Elected in Portland District 2 • Ryan Lizanecz, Vice Chair Elected in Portland District 5 • Nasreen Sheikh-Yousef, Secretary Elected At-Large • Shay Stewart-Bouley Elected in Portland District 1 RECOMMENDATIONS The Governance Committee met eight times in the fall of 2021 and interviewed 17 speakers with experience in municipal government, in addition to phone calls, emails, and conversations that committee members may have had with engaged members of the public and public officials. Several issues emerged about Portland’s leadership structure: Page 21  1 • No elected mayor has been provided the opportunity to meaningfully influence the development of the city’s draft budget, as specified in the current Charter. • There are no clear mechanisms by which an elected mayor may propose policies outside of the Council committee structure. • Council procedures make it difficult for individual councilors to advance policies outside of the committee structure. • City Councilors’ access to staff has been inconsistent over several administrations. • There is no method for holding the Council accountable to its own rules or for keeping the administration in line with the Charter. As such, these shortcomings have led to public impressions that the city manager is unaccountable and that the mayor is ill-equipped to pursue a policy platform. Furthermore, the limitations of developing policy only in Council committees has diminished the city’s ability to be agile and proactive amid changing societal dynamics and a gentrifying economy. As a result, the Council is frequently reacting to external urgencies, and referenda campaigns have increased in number and success at the polls. To address these issues, the Governance Committee recommends the following changes to Portland’s leadership structure. Regarding the Mayor • Ensure that the elected mayor has a prominent role in the development of the city’s draft budget with access to department heads and staff support. • Allow the mayor to form by right a staffed public task force around any policy endeavor not taken up by Council committee. Regarding access to City Hall staff • Create a new Chief of Staff who reports directly to the Council and whose office shall: o Coordinate Council staffing needs and requests for direct access to staff. o Receive, initiate, and track constituent services. o Fulfill all Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. o Notice all City meetings and post all materials. Regarding policy development at the Council • Formally allow individual councilors to introduce a policy proposal not on a Council committee at a Council workshop or public hearing. • Allow a member of a Council committee to “call the question” (initiate a vote) on a Page 22  policy that has been assigned to the committee for more than 90 days. • Allow a councilor to sponsor a policy initiative on behalf of a constituent that is not already assigned to a Council committee. 2 • When a referendum campaign has reached a threshold of two-thirds of the required signatures, initiate a public hearing at the City Council. Regarding accountable governance • Require a duly elected Charter Commission to nominate three of its standing members and one alternate to serve on an arbitration panel after the Commission has been dissolved (and until such time as a new Commission is elected). • The arbitration panel will convene when called upon by act of the City Council to interpret Charter language and provide a formal decision. These decisions will be binding for City business unless appealed to a court of law. These recommendations are referred to the Charter Commission by unanimous consent of three members of the Governance Committee: Commissioners Robert O’Brien, Ryan Lizanecz, and Shay Stewart-Bouley. Commissioner Nasreen Sheikh-Yousef was absent from the committee’s December 8 deliberations and has since sponsored her own proposal to the Charter Commission. METHODOLOGY At its meeting of August 11, 2021, the Charter Commission assigned these topics to the Governance Committee to examine: • Redistricting and Council Structure • Mayor/City Manager Roles, Powers, Duties, Accountability • School Board/City Council Relationship • Community and Neighborhood Boards • Office of Public Advocate • Home Rule • Human Rights Commission • City Staff Relationship to Elected/Appointed Officials From this list of topics, on September 8, 2021, the Governance Committee distilled related structural themes into one, overarching leadership topic: 1. City Leadership Structure: powers & duties, relationships, districts, terms. a. Administration b. Mayor Position Page 23  c. Council d. Council-Appointed Positions (Clerk, Corporation Council) e. Neighborhood Voices 3 The remaining topics assigned by the Commission were set aside for later examination. At the meeting of September 8, all four committee members agreed to design a leadership model on a zero-basis, founded on input from research and interviews, rather than adopting or hybridizing an existing model. WORK PLAN Election of Officers & Development of Work Plan September 8, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=39849 Minutes: https://tinyurl.com/minutes-sept-8 Values Mapping & Desired Outcomes September 22, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=40131 Notes about Values: https://tinyurl.com/commission-values • With facilitator David Plumb Chair O’Brien researched and sought input from fellow committee members on the speakers invited for interview sessions. Speaker nominations were derived from the personal knowledge of committee members, proposals from engaged members of the public, and discussions with the Maine Municipal Association (MMA) and the International City/County Management Association (ICMA). Mayors Interviews October 13, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=40566 Notes from Mayors interviews: https://tinyurl.com/mayor-interviews • Kate Snyder • Michael Brennan • Panel of Jill Duson, Jim Cohen, and Karen Geraghty • Ethan Strimling Experts Interviews Page 24 November 8, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41035 Notes from Expert interviews: https://tinyurl.com/expert-interviews • Dr. Chyrl Laird, recent Government professor at Bowdoin, now at U Maryland • Dominick Pangallo, Chief of Staff in Salem, MA 4 th • Dr. Jim Svara, UNC researcher/editor of 4 ed. of Nat. Civic League's Model City Charter Managers Interviews November 10, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41102 Notes from Manager interviews: https://tinyurl.com/manager-interviews • Joe Gray, former City Manager of Portland • Tanisha Briley, City Manager in Gaithersburg, MD; formerly in Columbus Heights, OH • Kevin Sutherland, ex Chief of Staff in Ithaca, NY; ex City Administrator in Saco; finalist for Town Manager in Bar Harbor (later hired) • Sheila Hill-Christian, former Acting City Manager in Portland • Note: former Portland City Manager Jon Jennings was invited but formally declined City Councilors Interviews November 29, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41552 Notes from Councilor interviews: https://tinyurl.com/council-interviews • Belinda Ray, 2015-2021 • David A. Marshall, 2006-2015 • Pious Ali, 2016-present • Kimberly Cook, 2017-2020 Leadership Model Deliberations December 8, 2021 Recording: https://townhallstreams.com/stream.php?location_id=42&id=41743 Notes from deliberations: https://tinyurl.com/deliberation-notes • With facilitator David Plumb FINDINGS All committee agendas, minutes, and materials may be found at this link: https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/1Vivn114pB2mnff7fjbLUT0PYpZvmetFA Page 25 Values On August 25, 2021, the full Charter Commission ratified this Guidance Statement: Create a structure of government which maintains expert administration while also promoting robust democratic representation, and public participation. This structure should ensure accountability, transparency, and accessibility while 5 increasing equity, inclusion, diversity, and justice. On September 22, 2021, facilitator David Plumb led Governance Committee members in articulating which values they sought to be reflected in a leadership model. The results were: Accountable and Responsive • There are channels for concerns that are accessible and result in actual responses. • There is a clear chain of command, and clarity on who you can speak with about your interests and concerns. • People see the connection between the public voice and decision-making. Transparent and Communicative • People know what is going on and there is easy access to information. Participatory • There are vehicles to participate. • Barriers to participate are removed – we recognize that time is a major barrier for working people. Representative and Giving Voice • Decisions are made considering the whole community. • Local government includes people with different experience and background. • Access to government is not defined by money. • The systems work for everyone. Efficient and Showing Leadership • City can tackle problems and reach conclusions. Local government is seen a place of solutions. • The city policy-making process works to address interests and concerns – people use it and see their interests met. • The city has big plans and develop bold ideas though a democratic process. Integrity Page 26 Key Takeaways: Mayors Interviews • All three recent mayors (Snyder, Strimling, and Brennan) said there is misunderstanding by residents about the current mayor position’s limited powers to pursue constituent services, to direct city services, or to enact executive orders. • All three recent mayors said they had inadequate input on the city manager’s draft budget. 6 • All three recent mayors said access to city staff changed dramatically among administrations, from virtually no prohibitions in the past to being highly regulated more currently. • The panel of past councilor-mayors (Duson, Cohen, and Geraghty) said: o Councilor-mayors typically had outside employment and volunteered part time at City Hall. o Councilor-mayors relied on a trusted, collaborative, and communicative relationship with the City Manager to pursue the mayor’s objectives. o Councilor-mayors’ goals were reliant on their relationships with fellow councilors. o Jill Duson noted that just prior to the last Charter Commission (2009-2010), the Council had gradually abdicated its policy-making powers to staff. The cultural norm on the Council had become for staff to present policies to Council for deliberation and endorsement. Key Takeaways: Experts Interviews • Dr. Chyrl Laird told the committee that the national movement to professional management of municipal government in the early 20th century was in response to corruption in political patronage systems, like Tammany Hall in New York City. • Dr. Laird also said the city manager system served to insulate the business class from more populist sentiments on city councils. At-Large council seats further diluted populist momentum. • Dominick Pangallo serves as chief of staff an executive mayor in Salem, MA (pop. 43,252). The current mayor, Kim Driscoll, has been a city manager in the past and has those professional skills. Salem’s mayor does not sit on the council and the council elects its own president, who also chairs the school board. • Mr. Pangallo said an executive mayor can see the city’s needs universally, similar to an at-large councilor, and can direct resources and programming to areas most in need. • Mr. Pangallo also said a mayor tends to be more responsive to public needs than a city manager on account of their elected status. • Mr. Pangallo said a four-year term is a very long time for an incompetent or destructive Page 27  mayor to run a city hall largely unchecked. Salem’s proximity to Boston benefits the city by the number of residents with professional skills who could run for mayor. • Dr. Jim Svara said the National Civic League’s Model City Charter endorses the council manager form of government. • Dr. Svara said a mayor should serve by the power of persuasion rather than executive authority, being the chief diplomat of city hall, interfacing between the council, manager, public, business interests, and outside officials. • Dr. Svara later emailed the committee to say that upon reading Portland’s Charter, he sees Portland’s conflicts deriving from the partial powers extended to the mayor, leading to confusion and posturing. 7 Key Takeaways: Managers Interviews • Joe Gray has 30 years of experience at Portland City Hall. He was first hired as an Urban Planner during the Urban Renewal era. Mr. Gray was installed as city manager on December 24, 2000 upon the untimely death of popular City Manager Bob Ganley. Mr. Gray retired on February 11, 2011. Mr. Gray served in a council-manager form of government. • Mr. Gray said effective leadership required constant and diverse input from the mayor, individual councilors, neighborhood groups, service providers, and business interests. Open, honest, frank, and regular communication was necessary to achieve productive outcomes. • Mr. Gray saw his job as listening to the mayor’s and council’s goals and setting up the systems to deliver on them. • Tanisha Briley is the city manager in Gaithersburg, MD (pop: 69,657), and formerly of Columbus Heights, OH (pop: 44,571). She talked about seeking out citizens where they are for input, namely events where she is likely to talk to busy parents. • In Gaithersburg, all council seats are at-large and Ms. Briley appreciated that for their city-wide perspectives. She valued councilors as crucial for “ears on the ground.” • Kevin Sutherland was once employed as chief of staff for an executive mayor in Ithaca, NY (pop: 30,569). • He mentioned that staff can sometimes drag their feet to wait out an elected mayor rather than implement a directive they disagree with. • Ithaca had to add the chief of staff position more recently to provide the mayor the professional expertise to run a city. Prior to hiring a chief of staff, mayors’ budgets led to excessive spending in efforts to fulfill their platforms. • In addition to managing city services, the chief of staff served as the gate keeper between the Council and City Hall staff. • In Saco (pop: 19,497), where Mr. Sutherland was the city administrator, the mayor was full-time with an office at City Hall. The mayor nominated the city administrator for hire to the Council. The mayor there chaired the Council but only voted in the event of a tie. Their primary responsibility was to build and bridge relations between the administration, the Council, and the public – which takes a great deal of effort and is Page 28  time-consuming. • In Bar Harbor (pop: 5,535), where Mr. Sutherland was soon to be hired as town manager, all ordinances go to public vote at the Town Meeting. • Sheila Hill-Christian has served as chief of staff in Richmond, VA (pop: 226,622), for both a council-manager form of government, and an executive mayor form of government. • She said in a council-manager system of government, there is more neighborhood focus. The council’s and manager’s staffs talked daily. 8 • With an executive mayor, Ms. Hill-Christian observed, there is an emphasis on political agenda and political relationships. There is a closer relationship between mayor's office and administration than there is with the administration and the council. • Ms. Hill-Christian said the mayor's platform was considered to represent the public's goals, but the day-to-day operations of delivering city services do not always come into consideration. It can be hard for City Hall to focus on the day-to-day when dealing with political issues. Executive mayors, she said, struggled with oversight of chief administrative officers. • In Ms. Hill-Christian’s view, mayors tend to think a few years out, not as long term as career professionals. Mayors wanted groundbreakings and ribbon cuttings to keep getting reelected. • Ms. Hill-Christian also had these thoughts on at-large councilors versus district councilors: Local constituencies that people can refer to is important; many small districts force local councilors to come to the table and compromise to get their fair share; smaller districts allow more communities to have more voice and not be ignored; smaller districts allow more people to participate in politics. Key Takeaways: Councilor Interviews • Belinda Ray served on the Portland City Council for District 1 from 2015-2021. • She shared: o Council holds annual goal-setting meeting every winter. Goals reflected in the city manager’s budget in the spring. o Policy initiatives from councilors, the mayor, and administration all go to Council committees. o All councilors have access to city staffers for support services and research upon request. o She met regularly with City Manager Jon Jennings and had an honest and frank rapport with him. She found the administration to be responsive to her requests. o Policy adoption reflects the temperament of the Council – some ambitious goals could be scaled back, while other ambitious goals could be expanded. • David Marshall was elected to the Portland City Council for District 2 and served from Page 29  2006-2015. • Mr. Marshall: o Had advocated before the last Charter Commission (2009-2010) for a much stronger mayor than what we have today, though the current iteration is an improvement over the councilor-mayor model from before. o Observed the current model today with the mayor as a member of the Council limits the elected mayor’s ability to pursue a platform. o Felt the newly required annual goal-setting meeting on the Council was an odd process to evaluate the merits of policy ideas. 9 o Saw the city’s government oscillate between “strong manager-weak council” and “weak manager-strong council” over different managerial styles. It was a matter of personalities, not the Charter structure. • Pious Ali is on the Portland City Council as an At-Large member. He was first elected in 2016. • Mr. Ali says: o It is difficult for councilors to move policies outside of the committee structure. o If the administration or staff are against your policy goal, they can interfere with its progress. o The mayor currently has no mechanism for moving policy proposals outside of committee structure. o Councilors are at the mercy of staff to fulfill individual requests or constituent requests. He has experienced some requests go unfulfilled. o He supports at-large councilors on the council makeup for their balancing of universal needs over local district desires. • Kimberly Cook represented District 5 on the Portland City Council from 2017-2020. • Ms. Cook observed: o There are no written, formal processes: the city manager will add items to the agenda as he sees fit. o The manager assigns staff, and how much a Councilor is helped depends on how much the manager supports an idea. o The difficulty of pushing forward big policy ideas on the Council is why Portland has seen public referenda in recent years. o Council rules are enforced only by Council, and inconsistently followed. There is no grievance mechanism when rules are breached. There is no means of holding the City responsible for its own rules of procedure. o Only one annual performance review of the city manager took place while she was on the Council, in 2020. The review was too narrow in its scope; there was not enough opportunity to ask questions, gather information, or engage the public. Page 30 [END OF REPORT] 10 Page 31 Governance Committee Colleagues, I present the below proposal so that we can consider a system of government for Portland that more fully moves us away from our current undemocratic City Manager. It was developed based on the principles I told the voters I would represent, one-on-one feedback from fellow commissioners who also ran on these principles, testimony from our committee hearings (although we need to expand that input as described below), emails and comments many of us have received, my own research, and input from community members. The core components of the model I am proposing are: • Democracy first; • Strong checks and balances between both branches; • Efficient administration; • Public accessibility/accountability. What I outline is based on the Mayor-Council forms of government that almost all other states in America have in their largest cities (see attached document). Of particular note, I looked at the eight other northeast states, which all have elected mayors in their largest city (From Bridgeport to Manchester to Providence to Boston, etc.). I also looked closely at Wilmington, Delaware. Wilmington is perhaps the closest to Portland in terms of population vs ratio to the state (70,000 in Wilmington/1,000,000 in Delaware). It is also Delaware’s service center, economic engine, and one of its most diverse cities, much like Portland. That said, no individual model from another city will work perfectly for us. After reviewing and discussing the below proposal, I would suggest the committee invite a number of elected mayors from neighboring states to join us by zoom. We could then get their direct input on how their model works and what they would advise as we develop ours. As you will see, I have tried to address some of the committee concerns regarding the day-to- day operations and ensuring that our elected Mayor does not get bogged down in the minutia, while still ensuring public accountability that services are being implemented according to our values. Additionally, please note that my proposal contains an elected public advocate (PA). The public advocate position, as you’ll see, is a bit of a bridge, but also creates third party accountability. It will be able to fulfill some of the roles that were described in the committee’s version of a council chief of staff. The particulars are outlined below. Thanks, and I look forward to discussing this further. -Nasreen Page 32 Strong Council & Elected Mayor Powers of the Council City Council becomes the chief policy-making body of the city, including powers to enact all policy proposals, approve/reject all nominees for department heads and boards/commissions, approval of the city budget and all revenue changes (including ongoing scrutiny of expenditures/revenues), and emergency power approvals (further detail of these powers described in sections below). Councilors serve three-year terms, rotating, sworn in on the first Monday in January after the November election. No term limits. City Council elects 2-year Council President from its own ranks with majority vote (removal by 2/3rds). The Council President is the voice of the Council and meets with the Mayor regularly. President chairs Council meetings, sets Council rules/agenda, and creates/appoints/removes all standing committees/committee members/chairs. The President may create and appoint members to any ad-hoc committee to investigate a particular policy and/or investigate government malfeasance. Plus, any/all other duties bestowed upon the office by a majority vote of the Council. Council Presidents may not serve more than 4 consecutive terms. The City Council will have its own independent staff to meet its responsibilities, policy development, public communications, and administrative tasks. Council’s budget will be determined within the annual city budget proposed by the Mayor and reviewed in accordance with the budget process. Powers of the Mayor Elected Mayor ensures the implementation of policy and oversees the efficient administration of the city. No longer a member of the Council and does not have a vote. Does have the ability to propose policy for Council review and must sign/veto all legislation enacted by the Council (described below). The Mayor will nominate for Council review and approval a “City Administrator” who will be responsible for the day-to-day supervision of all Department Heads, also nominated by the Mayor, and city operations. The “City Administrator” will serve under the direction of the Mayor, however, will be required to attend any Council Committee meeting when a committee chair requests it. Mayor is elected on the same cycle as the US President (effective 2024) and sworn in on the first Monday in January after the November election. May serve only two consecutive 4-year terms. Nomination and Oversight of Department Heads The Council reviews/approves/rejects all Mayoral nominees of Department Heads to lead city staff (Chief of Police, Director of Public Works, Director of HHS, etc.). Council approves/rejects each nominee with majority vote after the council committee of jurisdiction holds public hearings/vote on each nominee (for instance: Public Safety Committee reviews nominee for Chief of Police). Staff below department heads are hired by their respective supervisors and do not need Council approval. Page 33 All Department Heads, after review/approval by Council, will report to and serve at the will of the Mayor after approval by Council, with day-to-day oversight administered by the City Administrator. All Department Heads, or designee, are required to provide all requested information to council committees of jurisdiction and testify to committees when called upon. All Department Heads may request to attend a Committee meeting to report on any matter pertaining to the committee’s jurisdiction. Policy Development All policy proposals must go through Council for public review/amendment/final disposition. All Councilors and the Mayor will have the right to submit policy proposals for Council consideration/review/action. All Department Heads, or their designee, will be available to elected officials for the purpose of any proposed policy development. (If a staff member or constituent wants to propose an idea for Council consideration, they can ask an elected official to sponsor the proposal). All policies, ordinances, orders, expenditures, revenue changes, etc. approved by Council must then be signed into law by the Mayor or vetoed within 10 days of passage. Council may override all vetoes within 15 days, with 75%+ super-majority. If Council overrides, policy is enacted. If council fails to override, policy is not enacted. If Council fails to override, Council may amend to generate 75% support of Council or to gain Mayor’s signature. Council actions that solely impact the operations of the Council (rules, procedures, committee structures, vacancies, etc.) or that are non-binding statements do not need to be signed by the Mayor nor can they be vetoed. Development, Passage and Implementation of Budgets Mayor develops/proposes City budget, excluding education expenditures, for Council consideration. Council amends/approves after public hearings. Same veto standard. The Mayor oversees implementation of the City budget through Department Heads. Council monitors implementation of the budget through committees of jurisdiction. May request that any Department Head under their jurisdiction attend their committee meeting to present budget progress and answer any questions. Mayor develops/proposes schoolwide education budget, in consultation with School Board Chair and Superintendent, for School Board consideration. School Board amends/approves after public hearings and sends to voters for approval. The city council no longer votes on the school budget. Page 34 Compensation Council salaries increased to $17K a year (from $6K), with annual COLA based on CPI (likely proposal from Procedures Committee member). Current benefits (HC/Pension, etc.) not changed. Commensurate for School Board members. Mayor salary increased to twice the average income for a family of four in Portland as defined by the annual census (up from 1.5x to recognize the increased responsibilities). Adjusted at the start of each new term. Succession Plan In the event of a vacancy or incapacity of the Mayor, the “Elected Public Advocate” (described below) is first in line to replace the Mayor. Council President is second. In the event of a Council or School Board vacancy, the Mayor nominates three people for consideration. Council or School Board may only seat from the list of nominations. Should they reject all three, the Mayor must nominate three others. Once seated, the nominee remains in place until the next general election. The seated individual may run for the seat. Elected Public Advocate The Elected Public Advocate serves as an independent ombudsperson for city government whose mission is to improve the transparency, responsiveness, and accountability of City government. An additional set of eyes and ears on the council and mayor branches. Public Advocate is elected on the same cycle as the US President (effective 2024). May serve only two consecutive 4-year terms. Duties of the Public Advocate Public Advocate is charged with meeting constituent needs (direct or referred by any other elected official), providing outside review of city agencies, responding to FOIA requests, investigating citizens' complaints about city services, and making proposals to address perceived structural shortcomings or failures for Mayor or Council consideration. Public Advocate has authority to propose structural changes to city government and/or greater oversight controls for Council deliberation and consideration. In the event of a vacancy or incapacity of the mayor, the Public Advocate is first in line to become Mayor until the end of the elected term. Nomination of the City Clerk The City Clerk, overseeing elections and Clerk functions, becomes an independent office of the executive and legislative branches by being nominated by the Public Advocate at the beginning of their term. City Clerk is approved/rejected by the Council. Once approved, the City Clerk reports to the Public Advocate and may not be removed without recommendation by the Public Advocate and 66% approval by the Council. The City Clerk is not term-limited and may cross over administrations. Page 35 Nomination of the City Attorney The City Attorney, providing legal advice to the Council/Mayor and constituents, becomes an independent office of the executive and legislative branches by being nominated by the Public Advocate and approved/rejected by the Council. Once approved, the City Attorney reports to the Public Advocate and may not be removed without recommendation by the Public Advocate and 66% approval by the Council. The City Attorney is not term-limited and may cross over administrations. Development, Passage and Implementation of Budget The Public Advocate’s office will be funded with no less than .05% (half a percent) of total revenue to the city in order to keep it independent of Mayor/Council determinations (current City Clerk/Attorney budgets total $1.5M). If they need additional funds, they may request such from Council for approval through the normal budget process. Appointments to City Committees and Boards The Council reviews all nominations to board and commissions for final approval/rejection, which are now made by the Public Advocate through an open and transparent application process. Council approves/rejects each nominee with majority vote after the council committee of jurisdiction holds public hearings/vote on each nominee. Public Advocate’s Salary: Public Advocate will be paid 1.5x the average salary for a family of four in Portland as determined by the annual census. Succession Plan In the event of a vacancy or incapacity of the Public Advocate, the Council will appoint a Council member to fill the role, and a special election will be held to fill the term of the Public Advocate vacancy at the next general election. Cost Analysis This proposal is projected to be revenue neutral. Implementing this Strong Council and Elected Mayor will save approximately $200,000. With the elimination of the City Manager, the City will save about $250,000 in salary and benefit costs. $50K of that would be used for the enhancement of the Mayor’s salary/benefits. The salary for the proposed City Administrator salary can be pulled from the current Chief of Staff position in the City Manager’s office. The Public Advocate’s salary will be covered by shifting the current Deputy City Manager salary (will save about $50K) and the Clerk and Attorney budgets will stay the same. The department Page 36 will then have around $250,000 for community liaisons, administrative work, and investigation costs. The cost for the increase to Councilor’s salaries is being explored by the “Procedures committee” and will be priced out in that committee. This proposal should take into account that a future Council may want to provide an additional stipend for the Council President. All that said, obviously if this passes, the annual city budgeting process will determine whether any particular provision should receive more or fewer resources. Forms of government for the largest city of every state State Largest City Population Chief Executive Vermont Burlington 42,899 Mayor West Virginia Charleston 47,215 Mayor Wyoming Cheyenne 63,957 Mayor Maine Portland 66,417 Manager Delaware Wilmington 70,635 Mayor New Hampshire Manchester 112,525 Mayor Montana Billings 116,827 Mayor North Dakota Fargo 124,844 Mayor South Carolina Charleston 136,208 Mayor Connecticut Bridgeport 144,900 Mayor Mississippi Jackson 164,422 Mayor Rhode Island Providence 179,335 Mayor South Dakota Sioux Falls 181,883 Mayor Arkansas Little Rock 197,881 Mayor Utah Salt Lake City 200,591 Mayor Alabama Birmingham 208,928 Mayor Iowa Des Moines 216,853 Manager Page 37 Idaho Boise 228,790 Mayor New Jersey Newark 282,090 Mayor Alaska Anchorage 291,538 Mayor Hawaii Honolulu 347,397 Mayor Kansas Wichita 389,225 Manager Louisiana New Orleans 399,187 Mayor Minnesota Minneapolis 427,728 Mayor Virginia Virginia Beach 450,189 Manager Nebraska Omaha 468,262 Mayor Georgia Atlanta 504,527 Mayor Missouri Kansas City 507,928 Mayor New Mexico Albuquerque 560,218 Mayor Wisconsin Milwaukee 592,025 Mayor Maryland Baltimore 599,827 Mayor Kentucky Louisville 620,578 Mayor Nevada Las Vegas 647,829 Manager Oklahoma Oklahoma City 649,021 Manager Oregon Portland 661,189 Commission Michigan Detroit 672,662 Mayor Tennessee Nashville 681,928 Mayor Massachusetts Boston 699,927 Mayor District of Columbia Washington, D.C. 702,455 Mayor Colorado Denver 716,492 Mayor Washington Seattle 749,627 Mayor Indiana Indianapolis 867,125 Mayor Page 38 North Carolina Charlotte 881,819 Manager Ohio Columbus 895,477 Mayor Florida Jacksonville 903,889 Mayor Pennsylvania Philadelphia 1,587,828 Mayor Arizona Phoenix 1,660,272 Manager Texas Houston 2,325,502 Mayor Illinois Chicago 2,705,994 Mayor California Los Angeles 3,994,928 Mayor New York New York City 8,879,928 Mayor Total Population 39,829,721 Pop. Mayor Cities 34,206,907 % in Mayor Cities 86% Almost 90% of Americans, in comparable cities to Portland, operate with a directly elected mayor. Page 39  COST ESTIMATE FOR CLEAN ELECTIONS PROGRAM IN PORTLAND, MAINE Cost Estimate Compiled By: Commissioner Marpheen Chann (At-Large), Chair, Charter Commission Ad Hoc Elections Committee Initiative: Establishes a Clean Elections fund to be administered by paid staff within the Office of the City Clerk, funds to be allocated by the City Council on an annual basis. COST ESTIMATE FY 23-24 FY 24-25 POSITIONS 1.00 1.00 Personal Services $87,733.73* $90,365.75 All Other $200,000** $200,000 TOTAL COST ESTIMATE $287,734.73 $290,366.75 *Grade: 2022 BAND C42 (37.5), Step: 0 (https://www.portlandmaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/31790/Order- 254-2021); City Clerk Correspondence; Benefits = 36.9% on average for City of Portland Non-Union Employee. FY 24-25 figure calculated with standard 3% COLA. ** Estimate from League of Women Voters Presentation on Clean Elections on September 21, 2021 (Slide 11)(attached). Page 40  Marpheen Chann <mchann@portlandmaine.gov> Clean Elections Position in the clerks office Katherine Jones <klj@portlandmaine.gov> Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 3:56 PM To: Marpheen Chann <mchann@portlandmaine.gov> Hi Marpheen Currently the Business License administrator's salary is around $56,000. The Principal Administrative Officer's pay range is roughly $65,000. I would think that the position of overseeing the Clean Elections for the City would require a financial background and an understanding of elections. So my best guess would be somewhere in the vicinity of $65,000. Does this make sense? Kathy Katherine Jones, City Clerk, CCM, CMC,Registrar City of Portland 389 Congress Street Portland, ME 04101 (207) 874-8614 (207) 874-8612 Fax Page 41  CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE FY22 Proposed Non-Union Pay Plan (2.0%) Effective 07/04/21 Grade / Step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 BU #2000: NON UNION 2002 BAND B21 (37.5) (H) $18.1800 $18.7300 $19.2900 $19.8700 $20.4600 $21.0700 $21.7200 $22.3600 $23.0300 $23.7300 $24.4300 Period / Weekly $681.75 $702.38 $723.38 $745.13 $767.25 $790.13 $814.50 $838.50 $863.63 $889.88 $916.13 Annual $35,451.00 $36,523.76 $37,615.76 $38,746.76 $39,897.00 $41,086.76 $42,354.00 $43,602.00 $44,908.76 $46,273.76 $47,638.76 2003 BAND B22 (37.5) (H) $19.8300 $20.4300 $21.0400 $21.6800 $22.3200 $22.9900 $23.6800 $24.3900 $25.1200 $25.8800 $26.6600 Period / Weekly $743.63 $766.13 $789.00 $813.00 $837.00 $862.13 $888.00 $914.63 $942.00 $970.50 $999.75 Annual $38,668.76 $39,838.76 $41,028.00 $42,276.00 $43,524.00 $44,830.76 $46,176.00 $47,560.76 $48,984.00 $50,466.00 $51,987.00 2004 BAND B23 (37.5) (H) $21.4800 $22.1300 $22.8000 $23.4800 $24.1800 $24.9100 $25.6500 $26.4300 $27.2100 $28.0300 $28.8800 Period / Weekly $805.50 $829.88 $855.00 $880.50 $906.75 $934.13 $961.88 $991.13 $1,020.38 $1,051.13 $1,083.00 Annual $41,886.00 $43,153.76 $44,460.00 $45,786.00 $47,151.00 $48,574.76 $50,017.76 $51,538.76 $53,059.76 $54,658.76 $56,316.00 2006 BAND B24 (37.5) (H) $23.5500 $24.2700 $24.9900 $25.7400 $26.5100 $27.3100 $28.1200 $28.9700 $29.8400 $30.7400 $31.6600 Period / Weekly $883.13 $910.13 $937.13 $965.25 $994.13 $1,024.13 $1,054.50 $1,086.38 $1,119.00 $1,152.75 $1,187.25 Annual $45,922.76 $47,326.76 $48,730.76 $50,193.00 $51,694.76 $53,254.76 $54,834.00 $56,491.76 $58,188.00 $59,943.00 $61,737.00 2008 BAND B25 (37.5) (H) $26.0300 $26.8200 $27.6200 $28.4500 $29.3000 $30.1800 $31.0800 $32.0300 $32.9800 $33.9700 $35.0000 Period / Weekly $976.13 $1,005.75 $1,035.75 $1,066.88 $1,098.75 $1,131.75 $1,165.50 $1,201.13 $1,236.75 $1,273.88 $1,312.50 Annual $50,758.76 $52,299.00 $53,859.00 $55,477.76 $57,135.00 $58,851.00 $60,606.00 $62,458.76 $64,311.00 $66,241.76 $68,250.00 2010 BAND B32 (37.5) (H) $26.0300 $26.8200 $27.6200 $28.4500 $29.3000 $30.1800 $31.0800 $32.0300 $32.9800 $33.9700 $35.0000 Period / Weekly $976.13 $1,005.75 $1,035.75 $1,066.88 $1,098.75 $1,131.75 $1,165.50 $1,201.13 $1,236.75 $1,273.88 $1,312.50 Annual $50,758.76 $52,299.00 $53,859.00 $55,477.76 $57,135.00 $58,851.00 $60,606.00 $62,458.76 $64,311.00 $66,241.76 $68,250.00 FY22 2000 NU Grade Band-B Non-Union Proposed Pay Plan (2.0 Pct) 2 04/28/21 Page 42  CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE FY22 Proposed Non-Union Pay Plan (2.0%) Effective 07/04/21 Grade / Step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 BU #2000: NON UNION 2020 BAND C41 (37.5) $31.2939 $32.2317 $33.2011 $34.2011 $35.2211 $36.2816 $37.3632 Period / Weekly $1,173.52 $1,208.69 $1,245.04 $1,282.54 $1,320.79 $1,360.56 $1,401.12 Annual (A) $61,023.00 $62,852.00 $64,742.00 $66,692.00 $68,681.00 $70,749.00 $72,858.00 2022 BAND C42 (37.5) $32.8645 $33.8435 $34.8539 $35.9040 $36.9755 $38.0973 $39.2395 Period / Weekly $1,232.42 $1,269.13 $1,307.02 $1,346.40 $1,386.58 $1,428.65 $1,471.48 Annual (A) $64,086.00 $65,995.00 $67,965.00 $70,013.00 $72,102.00 $74,290.00 $76,517.00 2024 BAND C43 (37.5) $34.5067 $35.5368 $36.6083 $37.6989 $38.8317 $40.0045 $41.1979 Period / Weekly $1,294.00 $1,332.63 $1,372.81 $1,413.71 $1,456.19 $1,500.17 $1,544.92 Annual (A) $67,288.00 $69,297.00 $71,386.00 $73,513.00 $75,722.00 $78,009.00 $80,336.00 2026 BAND C44 (37.5) $36.3939 $37.4851 $38.6072 $39.7701 $40.9632 $42.1872 $43.4517 Period / Weekly $1,364.77 $1,405.69 $1,447.77 $1,491.38 $1,536.12 $1,582.02 $1,629.44 Annual (A) $70,968.00 $73,096.00 $75,284.00 $77,552.00 $79,878.00 $82,265.00 $84,731.00 2030 BAND C45 (37.5) $39.0155 $40.1883 $41.4021 $42.6360 $43.9211 $45.2373 $46.5835 Period / Weekly $1,463.08 $1,507.06 $1,552.58 $1,598.85 $1,647.04 $1,696.40 $1,746.88 Annual (A) $76,080.00 $78,367.00 $80,734.00 $83,140.00 $85,646.00 $88,213.00 $90,838.00 2032 BAND C51 (37.5) $36.3939 $37.4851 $38.6072 $39.7701 $40.9632 $42.1872 $43.4517 Period / Weekly $1,364.77 $1,405.69 $1,447.77 $1,491.38 $1,536.12 $1,582.02 $1,629.44 Annual (A) $70,968.00 $73,096.00 $75,284.00 $77,552.00 $79,878.00 $82,265.00 $84,731.00 2034 BAND C52 (37.5) $39.0155 $40.1883 $41.4021 $42.6360 $43.9211 $45.2373 $46.5835 Period / Weekly $1,463.08 $1,507.06 $1,552.58 $1,598.85 $1,647.04 $1,696.40 $1,746.88 Annual (A) $76,080.00 $78,367.00 $80,734.00 $83,140.00 $85,646.00 $88,213.00 $90,838.00 2040 BAND D61 (37.5) $41.3611 $42.5955 $43.8701 $45.1861 $46.5432 $47.9501 $49.3784 Period / Weekly $1,551.04 $1,597.33 $1,645.13 $1,694.48 $1,745.37 $1,798.13 $1,851.69 Annual (A) $80,654.00 $83,061.00 $85,547.00 $88,113.00 $90,759.00 $93,503.00 $96,288.00 2042 BAND D62 (37.5) $43.4216 $44.7272 $46.0632 $47.4405 $48.8784 $50.3373 $51.8467 Period / Weekly $1,628.31 $1,677.27 $1,727.37 $1,779.02 $1,832.94 $1,887.65 $1,944.25 Annual (A) $84,672.00 $87,218.00 $89,823.00 $92,509.00 $95,313.00 $98,158.00 $101,101.00 2044 BAND D63 (37.5) $45.5939 $46.9611 $48.3789 $49.8168 $51.3165 $52.8565 $54.4373 Period / Weekly $1,709.77 $1,761.04 $1,814.21 $1,868.13 $1,924.37 $1,982.12 $2,041.40 Annual (A) $88,908.00 $91,574.00 $94,339.00 $97,143.00 $100,067.00 $103,070.00 $106,153.00 2047 BAND D64 (37.5) $49.7760 $51.2651 $52.8056 $54.3968 $56.0184 $57.7016 $59.4360 Period / Weekly $1,866.60 $1,922.44 $1,980.21 $2,039.88 $2,100.69 $2,163.81 $2,228.85 Annual (A) $97,063.00 $99,967.00 $102,971.00 $106,074.00 $109,236.00 $112,518.00 $115,900.00 2045 BAND D65 (37.5) $51.5611 $53.1117 $54.7032 $56.3445 $58.0379 $59.7827 $61.5672 Period / Weekly $1,933.54 $1,991.69 $2,051.37 $2,112.92 $2,176.42 $2,241.85 $2,308.77 Annual (A) $100,544.00 $103,568.00 $106,671.00 $109,872.00 $113,174.00 $116,576.00 $120,056.00 2046 BAND D71 (37.5) $48.0933 $49.5312 $51.0205 $52.5611 $54.1211 $55.7533 $57.4261 FY22 2000 NU Grade Band-C and D Non-Union Proposed Pay Plan (2.0 Pct) 3 04/29/21 Page 43  CITY OF PORTLAND, MAINE FY22 Proposed Non-Union Executive Pay Plan (2.0%) Effective 07/04/21 Grade / Step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 BU #1100: EXECUTIVE 1101 BAND E81 (37.5) $54.6517 $56.2939 $57.9872 $59.7211 $61.5061 $63.3627 $65.2595 Period / Weekly $2,049.44 $2,111.02 $2,174.52 $2,239.54 $2,306.48 $2,376.10 $2,447.23 Annual (A) $106,571.00 $109,773.00 $113,075.00 $116,456.00 $119,937.00 $123,557.00 $127,256.00 1102 BAND E82 (37.5) $57.3851 $59.0989 $60.8840 $62.7099 $64.5765 $66.5245 $68.5235 Period / Weekly $2,151.94 $2,216.21 $2,283.15 $2,351.62 $2,421.62 $2,494.67 $2,569.63 Annual (A) $111,901.00 $115,243.00 $118,724.00 $122,284.00 $125,924.00 $129,723.00 $133,621.00 1103 BAND E83 (37.5) $60.2517 $62.0568 $63.9235 $65.8307 $67.8099 $69.8499 $71.9411 Period / Weekly $2,259.44 $2,327.13 $2,397.13 $2,468.65 $2,542.87 $2,619.37 $2,697.79 Annual (A) $117,491.00 $121,011.00 $124,651.00 $128,370.00 $132,229.00 $136,207.00 $140,285.00 1104 BAND E92 (37.5) $68.1467 $70.1867 $72.2973 $74.4600 $76.6939 $78.9995 $81.3656 Period / Weekly $2,555.50 $2,632.00 $2,711.15 $2,792.25 $2,876.02 $2,962.48 $3,051.21 Annual (A) $132,886.00 $136,864.00 $140,980.00 $145,197.00 $149,553.00 $154,049.00 $158,663.00 FY22 1100 NU Executive Pay Plan Proposed Pay Plan (2.0 Pct) 1 04/28/21 Page 44 Clean Elections: Context and Best Practices Presentation to Portland Charter Commission, Elections Committee Anna Kellar, Executive Director, Maine Citizens for Clean Elections Page 45 Nationwide Examples New York City, NY 1988, 2018 Small Donor Match Maine (1st State!) 1996, 2015 Clean Elections Grant Arizona 1998 Clean Elections Grant Boulder, CO 2001 Small Donor Match Connecticut 2005 Clean Elections Grant Santa Fe, NM 2008 Grant + Small Donor Match Seattle, WA 2015 Voucher Washington, DC 2018 Small Donor Match Portland, OR 2018 Small Donor Match ...and more! Page 46 Goals ● Eliminate corruption or appearance of corruption ● Expand political equity ● Improve representation by allowing diversity of candidates ● Limit cost of elections Page 47 Key Features A Starting Point: Public Funding Charter Amendment Section 12. Public Financing of Municipal Elections The city council shall establish and fund a mechanism providing public campaign funds to qualified candidates for mayor, city council, and school board. The mechanism must provide sufficient funds to allow candidates who meet qualifying criteria to conduct competitive campaigns, must be voluntary, must limit the amount of private funds a candidate may raise, must only be available to candidates who demonstrate public support, and must be limited to candidates who enter into a binding agreement not to accept private contributions other than those allowed by the public funding program. The mechanism must be available by the 2021 municipal elections. Page 48 Key Features 1. “Provide sufficient funds to allow candidates who meet qualifying criteria to conduct competitive campaigns...” Candidates who use public funding must receive sufficient funds to get their message out to voters and respond to messages from opponents. However, competitive does not mean unlimited funding. Seed money or Seed Grants are also important elements. Page 49 Key Features 2. Must be voluntary The US Supreme Court has ruled that public funding programs are constitutional so long as they are not mandatory. This means that no candidate can be legally compelled to participate. It also means that the overall campaign finance regulatory system cannot make it impossible or impractical to conduct a viable campaign with private funding. Page 50 Key Features 3. May limit the amount of private funds a candidate in the program may raise Early campaign reforms focused on limiting candidate spending. But over three decades ago the Supreme Court ruled that limits on candidate spending are unconstitutional unless they are part of a voluntary system. The public strongly supports limits on campaign spending, and experience with the Maine Clean Election Act shows that candidates also like spending limits. Page 51 Key Features 4. Must only be available to candidates who demonstrate public support Public funding should support viable candidates, who are willing to work hard and have the support of a significant number in the community. For example, under the Maine Clean Elections Act, candidates demonstrate public support by collecting a set number of $5 contributions from their constituents before they qualify for public funds. This ensures that limited public resources are targeted to candidates who can show that they are truly viable. Page 52 Key Features 5. Must be limited to candidates who enter into a binding agreement not to accept private contributions other than those allowed by the public funding program A voluntary public funding system not only allows for overall spending limits, but it also allows strict limits on what any one contributor may give to a candidate. This helps prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, freeing elected officials to vote their conscience and the best interests of their constituents. With private funding, a single contributor can often give a very large amount, making many candidates feel a sense of obligation and indebtedness. Page 53 Additional Considerations ● Dedicated fund w/ annual appropriation and rollover, insulated from politics ● Independent administration w/ commission ● Public education and engagement mandate ● Allowing those with low/no disposable income to participate ● Date for implementation Page 54 Types of Programs ● Grant (ME, CT) ● Small Donor Match (NYC) ● Voucher (Seattle) ● Cost of fund is similar ○ Approx 100,000-250,000 per year ○ Less than 0.05% of budget Page 55 What to consider ● Variation between administrative burdens ● Equity - how many people are donors? How can they participate? ● Albuquerque and Santa Fe examples Page 56  Questions? Mainecleanelections.org anna@mainecleanelections.org Page 57  CLEAN ELECTIONS PROPOSAL Sponsored by Commissioner Catherine Buxtion (At-Large) Section 12. Public Financing of Municipal Elections The City Council shall establish and fully fund a mechanism providing public campaign funds to qualified candidates for elected municipal offices. The Council will provide an independent allocation from the City’s budget each year in order to ensure the program is sustained and can be made available to candidates for each election. The mechanism must: ● Provide sufficient funds to allow candidates who meet qualifying criteria to conduct competitive campaigns. ● Be voluntary. ● Limit the amount of private funds a candidate may raise. ● Only be available to candidates who demonstrate public support. ● Be limited to candidates who enter into a binding agreement not to accept private contributions other than those allowed by the public funding program. ● Require that all unused funds from a participating candidate’s campaign are returned to the public election fund within 100 days of election. ● Be limited to candidates who agree to participate in at least one city-sponsored debate or voter education event. The mechanism must be available by the 2024 municipal election. The mechanism shall be administered by the City Clerk. The Clerk shall ensure there are adequate resources, including paid staff, to ensure effective administration of the program. The city council may adopt additional regulations and ordinances not inconsistent with this section. Section 13. Campaign Finance Rules for All Candidates Page 58 a. Corporate Contributions. A business entity may not make contributions to any candidate for municipal office. The term business entity refers to a firm, partnership, corporation, incorporated association or other organization, whether organized as a for-profit or a nonprofit entity. b. Campaign Contributions Reporting. All contributions to campaigns for candidates or ballot questions must be reported to the City Clerk, aligning with all state guidelines. The Clerk must establish a searchable online publicly accessible database to include all reported campaign finance information. Page 59  MEMORANDUM To: Portland Charter Commission From: Jim Katsiaficas Date: March 22, 2022 Re: Legal Issues – Charter Revision Question(s); Districting Questions At a recent Charter Commission Meeting, Commissioner O’Brien asked who decides whether and how to organize charter commission revisions into one or more ballot questions. The answer is that the Charter Commission determines this by majority vote. Title 30-A M.R.S. §2105(1)(A) provides “A. If the charter commission, in its final report under section 2103, subsection 5, recommends that the present charter continue in force with only minor modifications, those modifications may be submitted to the voters in as many separate questions as the commission finds practicable. The determination to submit the charter revision in separate questions under this paragraph and the number and content of these questions must be made by a majority of the charter commission.” Commissioners have asked how City Council districts currently are determined and what legal standards apply, and asked if increases in City Council district seats necessarily require an increase in School Board seats. Article II, Section 1 of the current Charter provides for the division of the City into five districts for purposes of all City elections: For the purpose of all elections the city, including its islands, shall be divided into five (5) districts to establish compact and contiguous districts of approximately equal population. The city council for voting purposes may by ordinance divide the election districts into voting districts. The number of both City Council and School Board district seats are based on this provision. Article II, Section 2 provides for election of one City councilor to “be elected from each of the five (5) districts heretofore provided for [in Article II, Section 1].” Article III, Section 1 provides for five School Board members to be elected from each of the five districts established under Article II, Section 1. ONE CANAL PLAZA, PO BOX 426 PORTLAND, ME 04112-0426 207.774.2635 FAX 207.871.8026 www.perkinsthompson.com {P1999664.1} Page 60 March 22, 2022 State law (30-A M.R.S. §2503) requires municipalities that have districts to reapportion their districts through enactment of a reapportionment ordinance by the municipal legislative body within one year after the Maine Legislature completes its reapportionment, which follows each decennial national census. In that reapportionment, “Each district must contain as nearly as possible the same number of inhabitants as determined according to the latest Federal Decennial Census, but districts may not differ in number of inhabitants by more than 10% of the inhabitants in the smallest district created.” This is the result of U.S. Supreme Court decisions requiring equal weighting of votes. The City Council, as Portland’s municipal legislative body, establishes district reapportionment by ordinance. The City currently is conducting its reapportionment, which must be completed by August 10, 2022, 90 days before the November election. As noted above, the City Charter establishes five districts for purposes of all City elections, and so this sets out the number of districts and district seats for both Council and School Board elections. Except for the current Charter, I know of no other legal requirement that the number of School Board district seats equal the number of City Council district seats. However, there is the practical issue of conducting City elections if there were differing numbers of Council and School Board districts, since there would be two different sets of districts with different boundaries. Election workers at polling places would have to offer multiple district ballots since Council and School Board district lines would not be the same. This already happens where State legislative district lines divide City districts, and would add another layer of complexity to City election management. Moreover, in discussing this with the School Board’s legal counsel, I understand that the School Board has not taken a position on the potential of increasing the number of district seats, but that the Superintendent believes the School Board’s general desire for greater diversity of representation and for parity with the City Council means that the School Board would want to increase the number of district seats accordingly. {P1999664.1} PERKINS THOMPSON PAGE 2 Page 61  Council Districts Proposal Sponsored by Commissioner Marpheen Chann (At-Large) An issue that has been raised both during the Charter Commission election and deliberations has been that of increasing the size of the City Council to ensure more representation on the Council. The proposal is loosely based on Burlington’s (VT) model and Maine’s State Senate and State House districts (where State Senate districts overlay numerous House districts). In looking at the existing Council, another issue that arises is what to do with at-large seats. Currently, at- large seats are held by councilors from diverse backgrounds: Councilor Pious Ali, Councilor April Fournier, and Councilor Roberto Rodriguez. Research articles detailing the tradeoffs of at-large and single-member districts are attached. The original proposal taken up offered two avenues: Keep at-large seats or create larger districts that overlay ward/precincts that preserve the “unifying effect.” During a joint Governance and Elections Committee meeting, there was consensus that the number of total districts should be thirteen (13). Commissioners disagreed on whether or not to keep at-large seats. The Elections Committee at their February 15th, 2022, meeting agreed to forward the discussion on at- large seats to the full commission along with a proposal of a thirteen (13) member council. PROPOSAL:  Thirteen (13) Member Council o Ten (10) Districts or Wards o Three (3) At-Large  Redistricting o Use voting precincts as template for wards  Mayor Role o Governance proposals have mayor separate from the Council Page 62  Council Structure Analysis Population Size of District At-Large Is Mayor Pop/District Accountability Note Council Seats Seats on Council? Seat For how many members may a 10 Largest Maine Cities voter vote?*** Portland 66,215 9 5 3 yes 13,243 5 of 9 Lewiston 36,409 8 7 0 yes 5,201 2 of 8 Bangor 32,356 9 0 9 no mayor 9 of 9 South Portland 25,364 7 5 2 no mayor 5,073 7 of 7 Auburn 23,564 8 5 2 yes 4,713 4 of 8 Biddeford 21,526 10 7 2 yes 3,075 4 of 10 Sanford 21,387 7 0 6 yes 7 of 7 Saco 20,554 8 7 0 yes 2,936 2 of 8 Westbrook 19,266 7 5 2 no 3,853 3 of 7 Augusta 18,795 9 4 4 yes 4,699 6 of 9 average 8.2 4.5 3 4,279 ***figure includes 1 district member, all at-large members, and elected mayor if mayor sits on council exception is South Portland where district seats must be occupied by a district resident but all voters may vote for all council positions Cities similar in population to Portland in other states with 1-3 congressional districts Bismarck, ND 74,100 5 0 4 yes 5 of 5 Missoula, MT 73,489 13 12 0 yes 12,248 3 of 13 all 6 districts elect 2 members Rapid City, SD 75,258 11 10 0 yes 15,052 3 of 11 all 5 districts elect 2 members Santa Fe, NM 84,683 9 8 0 yes 21,171 3 of 9 all 4 districts elect 2 members Cheyenne, WY 64,618 9 9 0 no 21,539 3 of 9 all 3 districts elect 3 members Idaho Falls, ID 64,618 7 0 6 yes 7 of 7 Charleston, WVA 48,864 27 20 6 yes 7 of 27 Grand Island, NE 51,267 11 10 0 yes 10,253 3 of 11 all 5 districts elect 2 members Burlington, VT 44,743 13 8 4 yes 5,593 3 of 13 8 districts divided into 4 regions and each elects 1 at-large member average 64,627 11.7 8.6 2.2 14,309 Page 63  City Council Make-Up November 2021 The Portland Charter Commission will examine two important changes regarding the make-up of Portland’s City Council: 1. Should the number of seats on the Council be expanded? 2. Should Portland keep its hybrid structure (at-large + district seats) or opt for a council with a different structure? Political debate over the make-up of legislative bodies (national, state, and local) in the US goes back to colonial times with no conclusion as to what constitutes an optimal solution.1 This is because any given council structure involves complex trade-offs between multiple and oftentimes conflicting aspects of what constitutes “good government”. Municipal reform advocates have posited several widely-shared core values or goals for evaluating council reform efforts.2 Specifically, such efforts might be designed to: • increase the representativeness of council members • increase the responsiveness of the council to community needs • increase citizen engagement in council deliberations • increase the accountability of the council to voters • increase the council’s ability to make decisions for the public good • enhance the efficiency of council operations Experience has shown that reforms which make improvements in one or more areas can have negative effects in others. As a simple example, increasing the number of district councilors by having smaller electoral districts may be expected to increase the representativeness and responsiveness of a council but reduce its operational efficiency, its ability to reach consensual decisions, and the ability of individual voters to hold the council responsible for its actions. The attached chart shows the impact on each core value of three alternative proposals to change the make-up of Portland’s current Council.3 What we know about Council size The 2018 Municipal Form of Government Survey conducted by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) provides data on existing council sizes in the US. For cities with 50-100,000 in population (n=184), council size ranged from 3-40 members with the mean, median, and mode being 7.4 Small councils (4 members or less) and large ones (10 or more members) are unusual. Small councils do not provide the level of human resources and variety of views needed to run a city while large councils become unwieldy and make it difficult to 1 “No political problem is less susceptible to a precise solution than that which relates to the number convenient for a representative legislature…”, James Madison, The Federalist, #54. 2 For example: Muzzio, D. and T. Tompkins (1989) On the Size of the City Council: Finding the Mean in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 83-96 available at jstor and City Club of Portland (Oregon,2020) New Government for Today's Portland: Rethinking How We Vote. 3 Evaluation of impacts based on info in Muzzio and Tompkins, City Club of Portland, Naional League of Cities, Cities 101: At-Large and District Elections, and ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. 4 Numbers provided by Tad McGalliard, ICMA Director of Research, in email dated 9/20/21. Page 64 develop coherent policies. Five, seven, and nine member councils are most common with the odd number of members favored to avoid tie votes. There are few empirical analyses of the effects of city council size because it is difficult to isolate size effects from the influence of other factors, leaving much of the available information speculative and anecdotal. One size cannot be called better than others; rather, different sized councils are conducive to different goals.5 What we know about Council composition and election methods The 2018 ICMA survey found that exclusively at-large councils are most popular in cities of Portland’s size (49% of respondents). A mix of at-large and district seats was found in 31% of cities that responded to the survey; only 20% of respondents had district only seats.6 Conclusive research on how well the different approaches support particular values is scarce. In general, at-large only councils tend to be less representative of a city's diversity than councils with some or all district seats. Although at-large systems remain popular, the Supreme Court has frequently found them discriminatory because they make it difficult for minority communities to elect members to the council. An outlier is Cambridge MA which elects a diversified at-large council all at one time using a proportional ranked-choice voting system.7 Exclusively district representation tends to produce more representative and responsive councils, but only if gerrymandering is under control. On the downside, district only seats can lead to councilors focusing on narrow district needs rather than what is best for the entire city. Traditional single-member district systems are now being challenged by proponents of multi- member districts. For example, if a single member district system had a council with 8 district councilors, the multimember version might have 3 districts and 8 councilors, with 2 or 3 council members elected per district, depending on size. Proponents argue that multimember districts facilitate majority and minority representation from each district, increase voter choice, encourage voters to diversify their votes, allow more candidates to enter each race, and allow underrepresented groups to boost individual candidates.8 The larger the district and the number of councilors per district, the more likely elections will yield a diverse council. Portland's experience with a hybrid system has not been systematically studied in terms of the values listed in our table. In terms of representativeness, however, it is interesting to note that in the 110 council elections since 1984, women have won 35% (20 of 63) of district races and 30% (14 of 47) of the at-large races. Minority candidates have won 3% (2 of 63) of district races and 19% (9 of 47) of the at-large races. Portland's experience runs counter to the conventional wisdom that minorities do better in district races and women do better in at-large races. Conclusion The structure and size of the City Council are two among many interacting factors that affect city politics, so any changes must be evaluated in the context of other changes that the Portland Charter Commission may recommend. No single model is best for all situations, so understanding the advantages and disadvantages of different options is a first step toward identifying a path forward for Portland. 5 Muzzio and Tompkins. 6 Numbers provided by IMCA on 9/20/21. (n=183). 7 FairVote, Spotlight: Cambridge, accessed 10/20/21. 8 ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. Accessed 8/20/2021. Look for headings on Single-member districts: Advantages and Disadvantages and Multimember districts: Advantages and Disadvantages. Page 65 Page 66 Cities 101 -- At-Large and District Elections December 14, 2016Background Background The form of municipal elections varies from city to city, with three common variations: some cities elect their local representatives by at-large elections, some by district, and some using a mixed system. The election system of a given city is determined by the nature of the council members' constituency and by the presence or absence of party labels on the ballot. With regard to the first feature, there are two types of constituencies for city council members: at- large and district. At-Large All at-large members are elected to serve the same constituency, which is the population of the city as a whole. At-large election proponents favor having council members elected by the entire city because: • Council members in an at-large system can be more impartial, rise above the limited perspective of a single district and concern themselves with the problems of the whole community; • Vote trading between councilmembers may be minimized; and • The number of candidates available for election tends to be larger. However, at-large elections can weaken the representation of particular groups, such as people of color, especially if the group does not have a citywide base of operations or is an ethnic or racial group concentrated in a specific ward. At-large election systems are prevalent at the municipal level and a considerable majority make use of at-large voting in some way. At-large elections tend to be more practical in small cities and more homogeneous areas. District These elections select a single council member from a corresponding geographical section of the city, called a district or ward. District election proponents favor having council members elected to represent individual wards because: Page 67  • District elections give all legitimate groups, especially those with a geographic base, a better chance of being represented on the city council, especially communities of color. Several court decisions have forced jurisdictions to switch from at-large elections to district elections, and in most cases the reason was to allow more representation by specific ethnic and racial groups acknowledging that the prior system was a denial of equal access to the city’s political process. (See: McNeil v. City of Springfield, IL, 1987; and Williams v. City of Dallas, 1990; and Montes v. City of Yakima, 2014); • District councilmembers are more attuned to the unique problems of their constituents, such as crime levels, small lot development, trash pick-up, potholes, and recreation programs; and • District elections may improve citizen participation because councilmembers who represent a specific district may be more responsive to their constituency. However, councils elected by district elections may experience more infighting and be less likely to prioritize the good of the city over the good of their district. Larger municipalities tend to use district elections (Chicago and Philadelphia are examples). Mixed-System More than twenty percent of municipalities combine these two methods by electing some council members at-large and some from districts. Mixed systems which provide more district seats than at-large seats are more likely to stand Constitutional scrutiny. Sources Morgan, David and Robert England. Managing Urban America, 5th Edition. New York, NY: Seven Bridges Press, LLC, 1999. Moulder, Evelina. "Municipal Form of Government: Trends in Structure, Responsibility, and Composition." In The Municipal Year Book, 2008. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association, 2008. Renner, Tari and Victor S. DeSantis. "Municipal Form of Government: Issues and Trends." In The Municipal Year Book, 1998. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association, 1998. Svara, James H. Two Decades of Continuity and Change in American City Councils. Washington, DC: National League of Cities, 2003. Page 68  No. 14 The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts Scott Hofer Hobby School of Public Affairs Department of Political Science University of Houston sjhofer@uh.edu Cong Huang Hobby School of Public Affairs University of Houston chuang23@central.uh.edu Richard Murray Hobby School of Public Affairs Department of Political Science University of Houston rmurray@central.uh.edu October 2018 Page 69 Hobby School of Public Affairs White Paper Series___________________________________________________ The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts Scott Hofer, University of Houston Cong Huang, University of Houston Richard Murray, University of Houston This report provides a review of the existing literature about the trade-offs between at- large and single-member districts at the local offices in the United States. Overall, at- large districts were the most common form of representation in most local offices until the 1960s and the passage of Voting Rights Act in 1965. Since the 1960s single-member districts have been the method of choice for most local elections because they enable smaller, geographically situated communities to send their own representatives to larger legislative assemblies. The history behind these two electoral systems corresponds with their respective pros and cons. In general, at-large elections are found to improve diversity in gender representation on city councils with more female councilors being elected. On the other hand, single-member districts benefit the representation of some racial minority groups, including African Americans and Latinos. But the positive potential depends on context: (1) the concentration, (2) the size, and (3) the polarization of the vote. Specifically, the advantages of single-member districts are minimal in a largely homogenous community or in a community where underrepresented groups are not concentrated geographically. African Americans are found to be overrepresented on school boards with at-large elections when African Americans occupy a smaller part of the population. Keywords: at-large districts, single-member districts, gender representation, racial representation. Background The literature on structures of elections focuses on local levels in the United States because there is little variation in representation structures in higher offices (Davidson 1979; Meier and Stewart 1991; Rocha 2007; Zax 1990). The United States does have single member (hereafter: SM) districts in the 43 states that have two or more members in the House of Representatives, while U.S. senators are elected at-large (hereafter AL) in all 50 states, as are almost all executive officers at the state level. That being the case, the best opportunity to study the effects on of electoral systems are in the thousands of local offices in the U.S., specifically school districts, county commissions and city councils. Overall, at-large districts were the most common form of representation in most local offices until the 1960s and the passage of Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965 (Davidson 1992). The history behind SM and AL districts systems correspond with their respective pros and cons. While context is key, the following section is a broad overview of the existing literature about the trade-offs in both systems. Then we move to the discussion of more nuanced findings pertaining to gender and racial representation in these two systems. 1   Page 70  At-Large and Single-Member Districts   At-large elections have been employed when ruling majorities attempt to emphasize the corporate identity of particular jurisdictions and to suppress partisan or ethnic factionalism. The basic idea being that those elected to AL districts will be more likely to work toward the best result for the whole community rather than pander to the specific demands in parts of the community. Work in political science broadly illustrates that substantive representation is most common in AL systems for the wealthiest and most connected in the community (Enns and Wlezien 2011; Gilens and Page 2014; Meier et al. 2005). Additionally, AL systems have the benefit of increasing the diversity in gender representation with more women being elected in these systems (Trounstine and Valdini 2008). However, people of color are less likely to be elected in AL systems because the votes of racial minorities are diluted in elections that cover a broader area (Trounstine and Valdini 2008). The importance of AL systems for diverse cities has been the focus of lawsuits and VRA compliance. In more homogenous communities, the difference between AL and SM districts are less pronounced in terms of racial representation, while the overall trends of representation patterns along gender and economic lines remain. Since the 1960s SM districts have been the method of choice for most local elections because they enable smaller, geographically situated communities to send their own representatives to larger legislative assemblies. SM systems provide the benefits of localized democracy. In cases of city councils and school boards, elected members in SM systems might only represent a small neighborhood which allows legislators to be intimately aware of the issues of the local community. This allows the elected member to focus on the needs of their localized constituency rather than the interests of all. In diverse places, especially where diversity is in highly segregated communities, the SM systems promote diversity with increasing minority representation (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier et al. 2005; Trounstine and Valdini 2008; Zax 1990). Yet, this diversity in racial representation is likely to be contrasted with the loss of gender representation and the tendency for fewer women to be elected in these systems. As noted, SM systems have become more popular in the United States after passage of the VRA as a mechanism to increase representation of racial minorities (Davidson 1992). In some cases, SM systems were implemented due to lawsuits such as Thornburg v. Gingles in 1986 alleging the AL systems in place unduly discriminated against cohesive groups of people of color to participate equally in the process by electing disproportionately white officials (Kosterlitz 1986). Finally, a small, but growing number of communities have incorporated a mixed approach that combines AL and SM systems. The Houston City Council is an example of these mixed bodies. While there is variation in the impacts of mixed system (they should be thought of as a continuum between AL and SM) the conclusion in the literature is that mixed systems typically provide benefits similar to SM districts. These mixed systems and modified AL systems provide descriptive representation similar to SM districts (Brockington et al. 1998; Karnig and Welch 1982; Welch 1990). Given the proportion of SM to AL districts (11 to 5) on the Houston City Council,1 it is especially likely to produce representation outcome similar to purely SM district systems.                                                                                                                         1 https://www.houstontx.gov/council/. 2   Page 71 Hobby School of Public Affairs White Paper Series___________________________________________________   The Voting Rights Act and Electoral Structures In the United States, AL elections were popular for local elections; especially as a mechanism to ensure that a bloc-voting white majority could deny black citizens the opportunity to choose representatives of their choice in local governments. In 1965, mass politics changed the landscape of racial diversity and racial representation through the VRA. Language allowing judicial review of minority vote dilution efforts in places with a history of disenfranchising minority voters initially helped push communities away from AL systems. However, court rulings undermined this language in the late 1970s. By 1980, the courts had established that racial minorities must prove that a challenged election structure was designed or maintained intentionally to dilute their voting power. However, the passage of the VRA of 1982 changed this standard was from racial intent to vote dilution in practice, making minority lawsuits more likely to succeed. The 1986 Thornburg v. Gingle ruling created a quicker and easier process for providing a remedy for vote dilution, resulting in widespread changes from AL elections to SM elections, through both litigation and legislation (Davidson 1992; Kosterlitz 1986). Although the courts would later reverse course on some aspects of the VRA, the legacy of the rulings in the 1980s has become the status quo. Electoral Systems and Gender Representation One major focus in the relevant literature is on the role of gender representation in AL versus SM structures. Table 1 summarizes the trade-offs between these two systems regarding gender representation in particular. While SM districts are typically seen as a remedy to a lack of diversity, AL districts are the most likely to produce female elected members (Trounstine and Valdini 2008). Unlike racial diversity, gender diversity among the population is stable across geography. The existing scholarship on gender representation overwhelmingly suggests that SM districts either lead to fewer women being elected on city councils (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1985; Hogan 2001; Matland 1995; Matland and Brown 1992; Rule 1994; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Welch and Studlar 1990) or no effect (Alozie and Manganero 1993; Bullock and MacManus 1991). This result may make more sense in terms of the non-exclusive relationship between race and gender (Githens and Prestage 1977). For instance, nuanced analysis of intersectionality found that black women tend to be advantaged by AL elections in cities while black men are disadvantaged by this structure (Darcy, Hadley, and Kirksey 1993; Rule 1992). However, there is no influence of SM versus AL districts for Mexican American women or men (Karnig and Welch 1979). A more recent study (2008) by Trounstine and Valdini that focused on more than 7,000 United States cities also found that the impact of either AL or SM district on gender representation is much more significant regarding white female and black male representation than was the case for Latinas or black women. 3   Page 72  At-Large and Single-Member Districts   Table 1. The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts – Gender Representation Electoral Systems Effects Literature Single-member districts (1) Have positive effect on the Karnig and Welch (1979) representation of African American men in city councils. (2) Have negative effect on the Herrick and Welch (1992) representation of African American women in city councils. (3) Have no effect on the Karnig and Welch (1979) representation of Mexican American women or men in city councils. At-large districts (1) Promote diversity in gender Trounstine and Valdini representation on city councils. (2008) (2) Benefit African American Darcy, Hadley, and Kirksey female candidates. (1993) (3) African American male Rule (1992) candidates are disadvantaged by this structure. Note: Regarding mixed systems, they are considered to provide descriptive representation similar to single- member districts (see e.g., Brockington et al.). Same for Table 2. Electoral Systems and Racial Representation The historical transformation at the local level from AL to SM has had the expected impact. Majority-minority districts became very popular in the 1990s and the representation of underrepresented groups began to improve (Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996). Table 2 lists the trade-offs on racial representation specifically. Numerous studies put forward that SM districts have positive effect on the representation of some racial groups in city councils, including African Americans and Latinos (Arrington and Watts 1991; Bullock and MacManus 1990; Davidson and Grofman 1994; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1991; Welch 1990). If equity in representation is the goal, in a diverse community, then SM districts are overwhelmingly cited as a better mechanism. 4   Page 73 Hobby School of Public Affairs White Paper Series___________________________________________________   Table 2. The Trade-Offs between At-Large and Single-Member Districts – Racial Representation Electoral Systems Effects Literature Single-member districts (1) Improve diversity in racial Cameron, Epstein, and representation on city councils. O’Halloran (1996) (2) Have positive effect on the Davidson and Grofman representation of African (1994) Americans and Latinos in city councils. (3) These effects are Trounstine and Valdini conditional on the context. The (2008) benefits are minimal in a largely homogenous community or in a community where underrepresented racial groups are not geographically concentrated. At-large districts (1) Lead to over-representation Arrington and Watts (1991) of minority voters where racial minority groups are geographically concentrated or where democratic voters make up a larger proportion of the population. (2) Lead to over-representation Meier and Rutherford of African Americans on (2014) school boards where African Americans make up a smaller proportion of the population. Despite the positive potential, the improved representation of historically underrepresented groups depends on context (Trounstine and Valdini 2008). The concentration (Sass 2000), size (Bullock and MacManus 1990; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004), and polarization (Brace et al. 1988) of the vote are the key variables to consider. For instance, in a largely homogenous community or in a community where underrepresented groups are not concentrated geographically, the benefits of SM districts are minimal (Trounstine and Valdini 2008). Conversely, AL districts lead to over-representation of minority voters under some circumstances where Democratic voters make up a larger proportion of the population and racial minority groups are concentrated in the area (Arrington and Watts 1991). Similarly, African Americans are found to be overrepresented on school boards with AL elections when African Americans occupy a smaller part of the population (Meier and Rutherford 2014). 5   Page 74  At-Large and Single-Member Districts   Houston Specific Outlook Given the trends found in scholarship on SM versus AL districts, we can make some educated predictions about the impact of these districts specifically for the City of Houston. Houston is a geographically large city with an incredibly diverse racial makeup; however, this racial diversity is also highly segregated by neighborhood (Houston Chronicle 20152). These two patterns make Houston an ideal location for a mix of AL and SM districts. The result of the concentrated pockets of different ethnic and racial groups in these districts will allow greater descriptive representation of the diverse communities within the city in the SM districts while the AL members must appeal to the broader diverse electorate of the entire city. References Alozie, N., and Manganaro, L. 1993. “Women’s Council Representation: Measurement Implications for Public Policy.” Political Research Quarterly 46(2): 383-398. Arrington, T., and Watts, T. G. 1991. “The Election of Blacks to School Boards in North Carolina.” The Western Political Science Quarterly 44(4): 1099-1105. Brace, K., Grofman, B., Handley, L., and Niemi, R. 1988. “Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice.” Law and Policy 10(1): 43-62. Brockington, D., Donovan, T., Bowler, S., and Brischetto, R. 1998. “Minority Representation under Cumulative and Limited Voting.” Journal of Politics 60(4): 1108-1125. Bullock, C., and MacManus, S. 1990. “Structural Features of Municipalities and the Incidence of Hispanic Councilmembers.” Social Science Quarterly 71(4): 665-681. Bullock, C. S. III, and MacManus, S. A. 1991. “Municipal Electoral Structure and the Election of Councilwomen.” Journal of Politics 53(1): 75-89. Cameron, C., Epstein, D., and O’Halloran, S. 1996. “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” American Political Science Review 90(4): 794-812. Darcy, R., Hadley, C. D., and Kirksey, J. F. 1993. “Election Systems and the Representation of Black Women in American State Legislatures.” Women and Politics 13: 73-89. Darcy, R., Welch, S., and Clark, J. 1985. “Women Candidates in Single-Member and Multimember Districts: American State Legislative Races. Social Science Quarterly 66(4): 945-953.                                                                                                                         2 https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-is-both-one-of-the-most-diverse-and-most- 6236793.php. 6   Page 75 Hobby School of Public Affairs White Paper Series___________________________________________________   Davidson, C. 1979. “At-Large Elections and Minority Representation.” Social Science Quarterly 60(2): 336-338. Davidson, C. 1992. “The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History.” In B. Grofman and C. Davidson, eds., Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective, 7-34. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Davidson, C., and Grofman, B. (eds.) 1994. Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Enns, P. K., and Wlezien, C. (eds.) 2011. Who Gets Represented? New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. Gilens, M., and Page, B. I. 2014. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12(3): 564-581. Githens, M., and Prestage, J. (eds.) 1977. A Portrait of Marginality: The Political Behavior of American Women. New York, NY: McKay. Herrick, R., and Welch, S. 1992. “The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation of Black and White Women.” National Political Science Review 3: 62-77. Hogan, R. E. 2001. “The Influence of State and District Conditions on the Representation of Women in US State Legislatures.” American Politics Research 29(1): 4-24. Karnig, A., and Welch, S. 1979. “Sex and the Ethnic Differences in Municipal Representation.” Social Science Quarterly 60(3): 465-481. Karnig, A., and Welch, S. 1982. “Electoral Structure and Black Representation on City Councils.” Social Science Quarterly 63(1): 99-114. Kosterlitz, M. J. 1986. “Thornburg v. Gingles: The Supreme Court’s New Test for Analyzing Minority Vote Dilution.” Catholic University Law Review 36(2): 531-563. Leal, D., Martinez-Ebers, V., and Meier, K. 2004. “The Politics of Latino Education: The Biases of At-Large Elections.” Journal of Politics 66(4): 1224-1244. Matland, R. E. 1995. “How the Electoral System Structure Has Helped Women Close the Representation Gap.” In L. Karvonen and P. Selle, eds., Closing the Gap, Women in Nordic Politics, 281-312. London, UK: Dartmouth. Matland, R. E., and Brown, D. D. 1992. “District Magnitude’s Effect on Female Representation in U.S. State Legislatures.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17(4): 469-492. Meier, K. J., and Stewart, J. Jr. 1991. “Cooperation and Conflict in Multiracial School Districts.” Journal of Politics 53(4): 1123-1133. 7   Page 76  At-Large and Single-Member Districts   Meier, K. J., Juenke, E. G., Wrinkle, R. D., and Polinard, J. L. 2005. “Structural Choices and Representational Biases: The Post-Election Color of Representation.” American Journal of Political Science 49(4): 758-768. Meier, K. J., and Rutherford, A. 2014. “Partisanship, Structure, and Representation: The Puzzle of African American Education Politics.” American Political Science Review 108(2): 265- 280. Polinard, J., Wrinkle, R., and Longoria, T. 1991. “The Impact of District Elections on the Mexican American Community: The Electoral Perspective.” Social Science Quarterly 72(3): 608-614. Rocha, R. R. 2007. “Black-Brown Coalitions in Local School Board Elections.” Political Research Quarterly 60(2): 315-327. Rule, W. 1992. “Multimember Legislative Districts: Minority and Anglo Women’s and Men’s Recruitment Opportunity.” In W. Rule and J. F. Zimmerman, eds., United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities, 57-72. New York, NY: Greenwood Press. Rule, W. 1994. “Parliaments of, by, and for the People: Except for Women?” In W. Rule and J. F. Zimmerman, eds., Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities, 15-30. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Sass, T. R. 2000. “The Determinants of Hispanic Representation in Municipal Government.” Southern Economic Journal 66(3): 609-630. Schwindt-Bayer, L. A., and Mishler, W. 2005. “An Integrated Model of Women’s Representation.” Journal of Politics 67(2): 407-428. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 US 30. 1986. Trounstine, J., and Valdini, M. E. 2008. “The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity.” American Journal of Political Science 52(3): 554-569. Welch, S. 1990. “The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation of Blacks and Hispanics.” Journal of Politics 52(4): 1050-1076. Welch, S., and Studlar, D. 1990. “Multimember Districts and the Representation of Women: Evidence from Britain and the United States.” Journal of Politics 52(2): 391-412. Zax, J. S. 1990. “Election Methods and Black and Hispanic City Council Membership.” Social Science Quarterly 71(2): 339-355. 8   Page 77 Page 78 Page 79 Page 80 Page 81 Page 82 Page 83 Page 84 Page 85 Page 86 Page 87 Page 88 Page 89 The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity Author(s): Jessica Trounstine and Melody E. Valdini Source: American Journal of Political Science , Jul., 2008, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul., 2008), pp. 554-569 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25193833 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Midwest Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Journal of Political Science This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 90  The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity Jessica TtounStine Princeton University Melody E. Valdini Portland State University Scholars continue to debate the degree to which electoral institutions matter for representation. The literature predicts that minorities benefit from districts while women benefit from at-large elections. The mechanisms by which institutions affect the ability of traditionally underrepresented groups to win seats have been understudied. Using an analysis of over 7,000 cities and interviews with city councilors, we find that compared to at-large systems, district systems can increase diversity only when underrepresented groups are highly concentrated and compose a substantial portion of the population. In addition, we find that the electoral system has a significant effect on representation only for African American male and white female councilors; the proportion of African American women and Latina councilors is not affected by the use of either district or at-large systems. Extensive research has been devoted to understand of the effect of different demographic contexts in varied ing the continuing under representation of women institutional environments. and people of color in legislatures. At the city level As the Supreme Court anticipated in the landmark scholars have found mixed results for the effect of single case Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), we demonstrate that member district elections in increasing descriptive repre compared to citywide elections, districts increase repre sentation. Particularly in places where citywide elections sentation when a group is geographically concentrated were implemented to dilute the vote strength of racial and moderately sized. Further, we find districts only ben groups, districts have been seen as a key factor in increas efit black men. That is, the positive effect of districts is ing racial and ethnic diversity. Alternatively for women, conditional on the context. Districts can increase oppor districts have been found to be detrimental to the election tunities for representation, but in some cases districts are of female councilors. Scholars have proposed numerous, not helpful. Only rarely do districts have a substantial im contradictory explanations for these findings. For minori pact. Taking advantage of variation among city institu ties the focus has been on residential segregation and size tional structures, council composition, and demograph of the group, while women are said to benefit from the ics, we use quantitative and qualitative methods to study multicandidate setting of at-large elections. For women these relationships. We analyze data from surveys of city of color these explanations are in direct conflict. This ar clerks and election results from more than 7,000 cities and ticle contributes to this large literature by exploring the connect this analysis to the experience of local legislators mechanisms by which institutions affect the representa through interviews with city councilors. tion of different groups, concurrently testing the segrega While the existing literature on underrepresentation tion and group size hypotheses and taking into account is vast, our article makes several contributions to the un the joint relationship between race and gender. Many of derstanding of the relationship between electoral institu our findings confirm conventional wisdom, but advance tions and representation. First, we offer a methodologi our knowledge in this area by offering empirical estimates cal contribution. While no model is perfect, our analyses Jessica Trounstine is assistant professor of politics and public affairs, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School, 303 Robertson Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544 (jessica@trounstine.com). Melody E. Valdini is assistant professor of political science, Portland State University, Division of Political Science, Hatfield School of Government, P.O. Box 751, Portland, OR 97207 (mev@pdx.edu). The authors would like to thank Zoltan Hajnal for the generous use of his data. They would also like to thank Chris Achen, Chuck Cameron, David Lewis, Doug Massey, Nolan McCarty, and Melody Rose for extremely helpful comments on drafts of the article, and Gretchen Kafoury for her very helpful advice on securing interviews with city council members. Benjamin Tagoe provided excellent research assistance. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 3, July 2008, Pp. 554-569 ?2008, Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853 554 This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 91 THE CONTEXT MATTERS 555 improve on previous research by taking into account the (see, for example, Arrington and Watts 1991; Bullock large number of cities with no female or minority coun and MacManus 1990; Davidson and Grofman 1994; Poli cilors, allowing us to make more precise predictions. We nard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1991; Welch 1990).3 Districts use tobit models to predict, first, the likelihood that a city have also been found to be beneficial to Latinos (e.g., will elect any women or people of color and then, to esti Davidson and Korbel 1981; Heilig and Mundt 1983; Leal, mate the proportion of female and minority councilors. Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Taebel 1978).4 These Second, while existing research on electoral systems and statistical findings have been supported by extensive case underrepresentation has tested the effects of either seg study and historical research as well (Bridges 1997; Rice regation or group size, we are the first to include both 1977). In sum, the literature concludes that "the effect variables in our analysis. Further, much of the work on of... districts is unequivocally... greater equity" (Mundt the effect of districts studies councils at or before 1990 and Heilig 1982, 1035). and/or is limited to a small sample of cities; we use re The literature on the representation of women finds cent data on a large number of cities to analyze patterns precisely the opposite effect for single-member districts. across time and place. Finally, most previous research as While there are some exceptions, the vast majority of the well as the Thornburgv. Gingles (1986) decision assumes research has concluded that districts are either meaning that the effect of electoral systems on the election of peo less (Alozie and Manganero 1993; Bullock and MacManus ple of color is constant across gender. For example, the 1991) or disadvantageous for women candidates (see, for justices refer to the effect of districts on the representa example, Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1987; Hogan 2001; King tion of "minority groups" or "black citizens," but there 2002; Mailand 1995; Matland and Brown 1992; Norris is no discussion of the possibility that electoral institu 1985; Rule 1994; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, Welch tions work differently for men as opposed to women of and Studlar 1990). color. The fourth contribution of our article is to question Because race and gender are not mutually exclu this assumption, and, although we have limited data, we sive categories, a handful of scholars have also sought present evidence that the effect of electoral institutions is to understand how electoral institutions affect women of significantly different for men versus women of color. color given that they face a potential double disadvantage Even after decades of progress there remain sub (Githens and Prestage 1977) and conflicting institutional stantial disparities in the representation of black/African effects. Existing research finds that black women are most American, Latino/Hispanic, and women city council likely to be elected in state multimember districts (anal members compared to their population proportions.1 ogous to at-large elections in cities) while black men are The average city in our data set has a population that is 8% disadvantaged by this structure (Darcy, Hadley, and Kirk African American, 7.6% Latino, and 52% female while the sey 1993; Rule 1992). Similarly, Herrick and Welch (1992) average city council has a membership that is 4.8% African and Karnig and Welch ( 1979) find that black men, but not American, 2.3% Latino, and 20.5% female. Yet, there is black women, are advantaged by districts. Further, Karnig wide variation among municipalities and across time. A and Welch (1979) find no effect of districts for Mexican clear question emerges: why do some cities do better than American men or women. This suggests that the effect of others at electing women and people of color? districts should be conditional on the characteristics of the group as well as the candidate in question. In addition to academic work, the process of vote dilution and the effect of institutional structures on rep Single-Member Districts: An resentation have been the subject of intense legal analy Institutional Solution? sis. The United States Supreme Court held in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) that in challenging at-large or multi One of the most persistent findings by scholars of urban member districts minority plaintiffs must demonstrate politics is that single-member district elections increase (among other things) that the group in question is suffi descriptive representation of underrepresented racial and ciently large and compact enough to constitute a majority ethnic groups on city councils.2 This effect has been of a single-member district. While these criteria are con found to be particularly strong for African Americans sistently used in legal and scholarly work, there have been 1 We use the terms black/African American and Hispanic/Latino in terchangeably. Due to data limitations we are not able to study the 3Others find that districts are not superior (e.g., Bullock and Mac effect of electoral institutions for Asian Americans. Manus 1993) or that the effect of districts has substantially weak ened over time (Welch 1990). 2 Descriptive representation and substantive representation are not interchangeable. See Guinier (1992) and T?te (2003) for in-depth 4Others find that at-large systems offer better representation for discussions. Latinos (e.g., Mladenka 1989) This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 92  556 JESSICA TROUNSTINE AND MELODY E. VALDINI no studies that have determined whether or not districts cil. We predict that geographically concentrated, midsized serve to increase representation when these conditions are groups will benefit most from district elections. met at the local level. We begin to do so here. Finally, these expectations rely on an assumption of Cities in the United States tend to elect their city coun polarized voting. The group must vote in a substantial cils using two electoral system types: single-member dis bloc for candidates who are members of the group, and tricts or at-large elections. When councilors are elected other groups must be substantially unwilling to vote for by district, the city is divided into geographic areas of members of the group (Brace et al 1988; Davidson and roughly equal population size that elect a single member Korbel 198 l;Engstrom and McDonald 1982). If either one to the city council in a plurality or majoritarian contest. of these does not hold, it is unclear whether the electoral An at-large system is one in which members of the city system will have any direct effect on group representation. council are selected by the entire city electorate. In most Polarized voting affects different racial and ethnic cities this means that voters are offered a slate of candi minorities to different degrees. For instance, the more dates and are allowed the same number of votes as there heterogeneous the group is, the less likely they may be to are seats available. Cities often have majoritarian require vote as a bloc, which is particularly important for Latino ments such that if a candidate does not receive 50% of communities (Pach?n 1999). For this reason we expect the vote she is forced into a run-off election. Some cities the effect of districts to be less pronounced for Latinos designate seats or residency requirements for at-large po relative to African Americans. However, we still expect sitions turning the election into a series of single-member districts to have some impact. Research has found that contests, while other cities vote for only one at-large mem Latinos share a significant number of characteristics that ber in any given election. A small but growing number of encourage ethnically based voting, including discrimina cities use mixed systems, electing some council members tion, immigrant experiences, Latin American heritage, by district and others at-large. Scholars have found that and Spanish language (see Bar reto 2004 for a literature these mixed systems as well as modified at-large systems review). Further, due to the lack of partisan identifica that employ different vote count procedures lead to de tion in most city-level contests, candidate characteristics scriptive representation at levels closer to single-member like race, ethnicity, or gender may take on additional im districts (Brockington et al. 1998; Karnig and Welch 1982; portance for voters looking for informational cues (Bobo Welch 1990). The number of cities using pure at-large 1988; Kaufmann 2004; Popkin 1991; T?te 2003; Valdini systems has declined over the past 20 years, but at-large 2006). elections remain a common feature in city politics. The Nearly all of the research on racially polarized voting majority of cities in our study elect their members at-large. has concentrated on state- and federal-level elections (see In order for district elections to increase the propor Hutchings and Valentino 2005 for a review). At the lo tion of councilors relative to the population size of an cal level, Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) found that blacks underrepresented group, previous literature has posited and Latinos tended to vote most cohesively for the same that three factors might come into play: concentration, candidate. Across 10 of the United States' largest cities, size, and polarization of the vote. First, the group must be 74% of blacks and 72% of Latinos voted for the group's geographically concentrated to take advantage of districts majority preferred candidate. This was compared to 67% (Sass 2000; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982). If group members of whites voting for the group's first choice. Additionally are spread throughout the city so that they do not com they find a significant racial/ethnic divide in votes for the pose a simple majority of any one district, presumably winning candidate, with a 39 percentage point gap be districts would not increase representation of the group tween whites and African Americans, and a 20 percentage compared to an at-large system. point gap between whites and Latinos. These figures bol The size of the group (of voting age citizens) should ster our prediction that districts will be most helpful for also impact the efficacy of districts (Brace et al. 1988; Bul African Americans. lock and MacManus 1990; Grofman and Handley 1989; The logic of concentration and group size also works Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004). At minimum, if to explain potential differential effects of districts for peo the group represents less than one-half of the population ple of color and women. Women are rarely (if ever) highly concentrated in a community. The same can be said for needed to elect a single council seat, districts are unlikely to ensure greater representation than at-large systems. Al group size and the representation of women. Because ternatively, if a group composes a majority of the city women are nearly always between 48% and 52% of a com population in a majoritarian, at-large system, the group munity's population, we cannot expect that they will be maybe able to win all of the council seats. Districts might aided by districts. Furthermore, there is little evidence of even decrease the group's representation on the city coun gender-polarized voting. A number of studies have found This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 93  THE CONTEXT MATTERS 557 that voters evaluate female candidates drawing on gen sented than white women (Darcy and Hadley 1988; Gar dered stereotypes (e.g., Dolan 2004; Huddy and Terkild cia Bedolla, T?te, and Wong 2005; Montoya, Hardy-Fanta, sen 1993; McDermott 1997; Valdini 2006) and that these and Garcia 2000). Garcia Bedolla, T?te, and Wong (2005) stereotypes can affect perceptions about candidates (Koch explain this finding as potentially resulting from block 2000) and vote choice (Brown 1994; Brown, Heighberger, group voting. This would also be supported by Philpot and Shocket 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002). and Walton's (2007) finding that black men tend to be However, stereotyping only equates to polarized vot stronger supporters of black female candidates than white ing when there are gendered differences in the judgments women or white men. Further, a number of studies have of voters. Some research has determined that women are found that race trumps gender in determining voting be more likely to prefer female candidates and men to prefer havior and attitudes (Gay and T?te 1998; Lien 1998) and male candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2002). But, other scholars that the gender gap is essentially the same across racial and argue that there is little evidence of gender group con ethnic groups (Welch and Sigelman 1992). In sum, while sciousness (Conover 1988; Gurin 1985) and that women we expect white women to benefit from at-large elections, are equally if not more unlikely to vote for female can and black men to benefit from districts, there are no clear didates as men (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Karnig and hypotheses that emerge for black women and Latinas with Walter 1976). In the aggregate, the gender gap (while per regard to the effect of institutional structure. sistent) tends to be small with regard to support for parties and candidates (see Norrander 2003 for a review). So although it is likely that women are treated differ ently from men in elections, it is unclear how these differ Testing the Effects of the Electoral ences should interact with institutional variation. Accord System on Representation ing to the criteria specified in Thornburgv. Gingles (1986), women are unlikely to benefit from districts. Scholars have To understand more about why single-member districts suggested, among other reasons, that women might do help certain underrepresented groups and not others, we better in multimember elections (such as at-large sys begin by testing the relationship between electoral struc tems) because the competition is not zero-sum, mean ture and diversity in cities. Our data come from surveys ing that voters need not choose women at the expense of by the International City/County Manager's Association men (Karnig and Welch 1979; Mailand and Brown 1992; (ICMA) conducted in 1986, 1992, 1996, and 2001. The Mailand and Studlar 1996). On the other hand, scholars ICMA survey is mailed to city clerks in approximately have not proposed that the zero-sum calculation applies 7,500 cities including all municipalities with more than to racial and ethnic minorities.5 This implies that the elec 2,500 residents. The average survey response rate for the toral structure is predicted to affect racial and ethnic mi years we analyze is 63%.6 The survey provides demo norities in a different way and for different reasons than graphic information about council members and insti women. So how should our expectation change when we tutional variables for the cities. To control for city-level are talking about women of color; do the predictions for demographics we use 1990 census data for all 1986 obser multimember elections only apply to white women? vations, 2000 census data for all 2001 observations, and There is some evidence that racial bloc group vot linearly interpolate values for 1992 and 1996. In total we ing does not apply to women of color, particularly when have 7,174 unique cities in the data set. men of color are also running. McClain, Carter, and Brady (2005) find that black women have a harder time gain 6Determining the effect of response rates to the ICMA is difficult ing the support of race-based organizations compared to because no other source contains institutional data for the same black men, and Philpot and Walton (2007) find that black time period; but we can use data from the 1987 Census of Govern women are the strongest supporters of black female can ments (COG) as a comparison for our main independent variable. The proportions of councilors elected in each type of system are didates. Given that our concentration and size hypotheses similar in the two data sets. In the 1986 ICMA data 72.3% of cities depend on polarized voting, we might not expect districts elected councilors at-large, 11.6% used districts, and 16.2% used a to help black women. On the other hand, some scholars mixed system. The COG reports 74.2% of cities elected councilors at-large, 13.5% used districts, and 12.3% used a mixed system. It have found that black women and Latinas are better repre does appear that western and southern cities are underrepresented in the ICMA compared to the census. The control variables included 5 Clearly more research should be done to determine the extent to in our analyses should mitigate the effect of this underrepresenta which zero-sum calculations apply to different groups. It is possible tion; nonetheless we add the caveat that our findings are most di that even in at-large settings such a calculation could be invoked, rectly applicable to the types of cities included in the ICMA sample. particularly when cities use designated post systems or staggered Weighting by region does not change our conclusions. Summary elections. statistics for all variables are available from the authors. This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 94  558 JESSICA TROUNSTINEAND MELODY E. VALDINI In addition to the statistical analysis, we present re sus council manager systems,9 the size of the city council,10 sponses from interviews of current city councilors from the presence of term limits, and a dummy variable noting a sample of cities with mixed electoral systems.7 These whether city elections are held concurrently with national interviews served a number of purposes in our investi elections.11 Because some city institutions are subject to gation. First, they helped us to identify the contextual closer scrutiny as a result of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) factors that interact with institutions and affect the elec and our primary independent variable (elections by dis tion of women and minority councilors. Secondly, they trict) may in fact be the result of challenges brought under provide useful examples of our empirical findings. Fi the VRA, we include a dummy variable indicating juris nally, they offer face validity of our findings from people dictions required to secure preclearance as per Section 5. working in city politics. As we had hoped, all of the in We include citywide socioeconomic variables to account terviewees in our sample were familiar with both types for the possibility that female or minority presence on the of electoral systems and made a decision to run in one council is linked to wealthier or more educated commu type rather than the other. Of the 174 councilors serv nities.12 ing in 2006, 98 (or 56%) were female and/or persons of We control for potential region effects and the racial color. We randomly selected one-third of these members and ethnic makeup of the city population. Latinos have for an interview. Eleven councilors chose to participate in lower citizenship rates and younger populations than a phone interview in which we asked respondents open whites and African Americans, perhaps limiting their abil ended questions regarding the effect of electoral institu ity to affect election outcomes (Jones-Correa 1998). To tions for electing white women, women of color, and men control for this we include a measure of the total propor of color.8 tion of the city population that are noncitizens and the In the quantitative analysis our dependent variables proportion that is 18 and older. To account for liberal lean are the proportion of city councils that are black, Latino, ing communities that might be more likely to elect women and female. Unfortunately, the ICMA survey data do not and minorities, we include a measure of the countywide specify the race of women councilors or the gender (or vote for the Democratic presidential candidate in 1988 ethnic background) of those in the included racial cate and a dummy variable for central cities. To control for the gories. While it would be ideal to augment our discussion likely relationship between time and our independent and of women of color with ICMA data, we cannot. However, dependent variables, we include year fixed effects (with using data from a different source for 1986 we are able 2001 as the base category). Finally, in all models we in to perform a separate analysis of the effect of districts for clude the population proportions of African Americans, black women versus black men and Latinas versus Latinos. Latinos, and Asians in each city.13 As was true with our In all of the analyses our primary independent variable is dependent measure of racial and ethnic representation, we the percentage of councilors elected by district in each city. The majority of cities in our data set have a city council that is either elected wholly by districts or at-large, but 9 Using a more nuanced version of this variable allowing for mayor some have mixed systems in which a portion of the coun council systems with a city manager makes no difference to the cil is elected by district and a portion elected at-large. To results. capture this variation we use a continuous version of the 10 Scholars have argued that in smaller councils the value of each seat variable. is greater and therefore less likely to be represented by minorities We add to these regressions a number of other insti or women (see Welch and Karnig 1979). tutional variables that have been linked to minority coun 11 Ideally we would have also included controls for the city's vote cil representation either directly or indirectly through count procedure, but these data are not collected by ICMA, and the turnout and mobilization effects. These controls include large size of the data set precluded us from collecting it. nonpartisan versus partisan elections, mayor council ver 12Unfortunately, group-specific versions of these demographic variables are not available from the 1990 census so we were unable to test the alternative argument that group resources determine 7The cities are the 10 largest mixed system cities: Houston, Philadel representation (see, for example, Cole 1974; Karnig 1979). phia, Charlotte, lacksonville, Indianapolis, Boston, Washington DC, Denver, Nashville, and New Orleans. 13 Ideally these proportions would be in reference to the population of citizens over the age of 18. However, the census did not provide 8 We interviewed six white women, two African American men, one data for citizens over the age of 18 by race/ethnicity for our en African American woman, one Latino, and one Latina. Prior to tire time period. We tested alternative formulations of population each interview we requested permission to record and quote each measures assuming in 2000 a constant citizenship rate across age councilor. We received consent from all but one council member groups and in 1990 a constant citizenship rate across racial and who is not quoted by name in this manuscript. Transcripts are ethnic groups. The alternative specification made little difference available from the authors upon request. to the results and is available from the authors. This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 95  THE CONTEXT MATTERS 559 cannot account for racial and ethnic group heterogeneity detriment to women. A variety of simulations help to clar in these models.14 ify the relationships between district elections and repre Like most research on this topic, we restrict our results sentation. We predict the marginal effect of the electoral to cities with substantial minority populations. Rather system on the proportion of women and minority council than select an arbitrary minimum for the size of groups, members when moving from a system in which a major we allow the threshold to vary by city depending on the ity of the council is elected at-large to a system in which size of the city council. An observation is included if the a majority of the council is elected by district, holding group in question composes at least one-half of the per all other variables constant at their mean values. First, centage that a single council seat represents.15 Our analysis we predict the effect of districts on the probability of a assumes that black residents will be the strongest support city having any members of the underrepresented group ers of black candidates and Latino residents for Latino on the council. Then, we predict the effect of districts on candidates. The larger the city council the easier it should the expected proportion of female and minority council be for any group to win representation. Using a varying members, weighted by the probability that this value is threshold takes this into consideration. positive.17 The mean number of council seats is six, so on av For African Americans, having a majority of coun erage a city is included if the underrepresented group is cil members elected by district increases the probability at least 8% of the city's total population. We apply this of electing any African Americans to the city council by selection criterion regardless of the electoral system em more than 10 percentage points, from 73% in at-large ployed. When we test the hypothesis that the size of the cities to 84% in district cities.18 The expected propor group matters for the effectiveness of the electoral system, tion of African American councilors increases by about we relax this selection criterion and restrict the analysis to five percentage points under districts, from 13% to 18%. cities that have nonzero populations of the group in ques Because the average city in our data set has six council tion. This allows us to directly test the assumption that a members, in order for a group to gain an additional seat group will benefit most from districts when its population districts need to provide about a 16-point advantage. In is larger than one-half of the percentage of a single council our model, districts clearly fall short of this threshold for seat but less than a majority of the total population. African Americans. Due to the extremely large number of cities that have The key factor in increasing African American rep no female or minority councilors, we use a random-effects resentation is the proportion of the city that is black. For tobit model to estimate the effects of districts on council Latinos, districts have a weaker effect on representation. representation [y* = *? + ??*, where y? = y* if y* > 0 For both at-large and district systems the probability of &yti = 0 if y* < O].16 The model, a maximum-likelihood having any Latino councilors at all is low; 27% in at-large estimation censored at zero, combines the logic of probit systems and 33% in district systems. When this is taken and multiple regression to estimate both the probabil into consideration the relationship between district sys ity of a council having any female or minority members, tems and the expected proportion of the Latino councilors and given this, predicts the expected proportion of female is limited to about 1 \ percentage points, going from 4.1% councilors and councilors of color. in at-large systems to about 5.5% in district systems. The Do districts increase the proportion of African Amer Latino population in a city plays a key role in the election ican, Latino, and women councilors? The results displayed of Latino council members. Nearly equal in effect is the in Table 1 confirm that district elections continue to aid percentage of the city that has the rights of citizenship. minority members in getting elected and are a nominal Echoing the results of our regression analyses, nearly every interviewee in our sample agreed that district sys 14Scholars find that assuming ethnic or racial group homogeneity tems were better than at-large systems for electing peo severely biases estimates of representation (DeSipio 1996; Sass 2000; Tarn 1995), but we have no fix for this problem. ple of color. For example, Councilman Jamie Isabel, an African American member on the Nashville City Coun 15 We repeated the analyses using a 5% threshold of the group in question instead of allowing the threshold to vary based on coun cil, explained, "It's happened again and again where cil size (available upon request from the authors). The results are African Americans can't get enough votes to win at extremely similar and our conclusions hold in all cases. large." Susan Burgess, a white woman serving in an 16The likelihood function for each unit is computed using the at-large seat in the Charlotte City Council, echoed his Gauss-Hermite quadrature. The estimates were stable in multiple tests. Alternate specifications using a tobit model with Huber/White 17 Effects on uncensored observations are also available from the clustered standard errors are nearly identical. We further tested authors. weighted models to correct for heteroskedasticity and got similarly strong results. 18Predictions calculated using Stata/SE 9.2 mfx command. This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 96  5?0 JESSICA TROUNSTINEAND MELODY E. VALDINI sentiments, stating that districts are "absolutely" better we have had a Hispanic member elected to the school than at-large seats for electing people of color. Coun board." cilwoman Rosemary Rodriguez, a Latina serving on the Denver City Council, believes so strongly in the posi tive consequences of district elections for increasing the representation of people of color that she worked for The Effect of Institutions for Women electoral reform for other local offices in her city. She explains: "I actually persuaded the legislature to adopt For women, the results in Table 1 suggest that the prob single-member districts for Denver for a majority of the ability of a council having at least one female councilor school board seats so that we could try to achieve His is high: about 83% in at-large systems and about 80% in panic representation. And ever since that bill was passed, district systems, with the expected proportion of female Table 1 Tobit Regression on the Percentage of Minority and Female Council Members % Black % Latino % Women Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err % District 0.06** 0.01 0.05** 0.02 -0.02** 0.01 Demographics % Latino 0.18** 0.07 1.68** 0.08 -0.00 0.03 % Black 0.85** 0.03 0.17* 0.09 0.12** 0.02 % Asian -0.41** 0.21 0.53** 0.16 0.08 0.07 % Women 0.43** 0.16 -0.53* 0.32 -0.16 0.10 Total Pop (mil) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05* 0.03 % Poor 0.29** 0.10 -0.00 0.18 -0.07* 0.04 Med. Income (ths) -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 % Coll. Grad 0.23** 0.07 0.26** 0.13 0.21** 0.03 % Noncitizens -0.05 0.15 -1.26** 0.14 0.00 0.07 % Pop Over 18 0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.15 0.18** 0.05 Democratic Vote -0.14** 0.05 0.15* 0.09 -0.01 0.02 Institutions Term Limits -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02** 0.01 Nonpartisan 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.01 Mayor Council -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.00 Council Size 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 Concurrent -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01* 0.01 VRA 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 Geography Central City 0.07** 0.01 0.08** 0.02 0.02* 0.01 West 0.08** 0.03 0.05* 0.03 0.10* 0.01 Northeast 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.02* 0.01 Midwest -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04* 0.01 1986 -0.07** 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.07* 0.01 1992 -0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02* 0.01 1996 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.07* 0.01 Constant -0.37** 0.15 -0.46* 0.26 0.03 0.06 N 3042 2749 11537 1670.83* 1258.24* 1668.51* Waldx2 *p < .10, **p< .05. Source: International City/County Manager's Association (ICMA) surveys of 1986, 1992, 1996, and 2001. This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 97  THE CONTEXT MATTERS 561 councilors going from 20% in at-large cities to 18% in Clearly, the variety of responses and opinions given cities with district elections. None of the other variables on this subject is quite different from the nearly uniform perform particularly well predicting women's represen responses given on the effects of district elections for the tation. The model suggests that increasing the propor election of people of color. The wide range of responses tion of women in a city negatively impacts the chance of regarding the effect of institutions on the representation having women on the council. Women are also aided by of women is not too surprising given our statistical results. larger city councils. To test whether or not this finding We found that women are negatively affected by districts, reflects the benefit of increased district magnitude that but the results were small, with the predicted proportion other scholars identify, we interact this variable with a of women increasing only about 2% in at-large cities. In dummy variable indicating whether the majority of the sum, after controlling for a variety of factors, it appears councilors are elected at-large or by district. Our findings that districts have a limited but distinctly positive effect reflect the conventional wisdom (e.g., Alozie and Man on increasing representation for underrepresented racial ganaro 1993); women do better with larger city councils, and ethnic groups and a small negative effect for women but in at-large cities this effect is much more pronounced. that appears to be driven by the multimember nature of Once the interaction is included, the independent effect at-large elections. of at-large elections actually disappears. This offers indi rect support for the argument that women benefit from a nonzero-sum setting. The opinions of our interviewees reflect these mud The Intersection of Race and Gender dled findings of the effects of at-large versus district elections for women. Councilperson Carol Boigon felt Given that racial and ethnic minority groups seem to ben strongly that at-large seats are better for electing women efit from districted systems while women seem to do bet candidates. She explained that in her council, "the two ter in at-large systems, how do black women and Latinas at-large seats run at the same time?no differentiation fare in these cities? Our main data set does not provide the occurs?one race, two top vote getters get seated. So there racial and ethnic background by gender of city councilors; however, the United States Census of Governments col were seven men and me. So you win by a plurality, which really strengthens the hand of women." Council members lected these statistics in one year that matches our data? Jamie Isabel, Glorious Johnson, Susan Burgess, and Anna 1986. In this year about 16% of white and black councilors Verna, on the other hand, all felt that districts are the bet and about 18% of Hispanic councilors were women. For ter choice for increasing the number of women in office. the following analyses we use as dependent variables the However, when asked why they felt that district elections proportion of the city council that is black women, black are better for electing women, every respondent gave a men, Latinas, Latinos, and white (non-Hispanic) women. different answer. We include all of the controls described above. As above Councilwoman Johnson explained districts were bet we only include cities with substantial minority and fe ter because of the ability of women to be active and known male populations.19 within their districts, stating that the women currently The results in Table 2 suggest differential effects of serving in district seats on her council "have... clout districts for black women and Latinas. Where district elec when it comes to that district because they have been tions have no significant effect on increasing the propor known since they were children." Councilwoman Burgess tion of councilors who are black women, black men get a suggested that districts are better for women because they significant boost from this institutional structure. In fact are less competitive. She explained, "Once you win a dis all of the predicted increase in representation found in Ta trict election, many times the district representatives don't ble 1 is attributable to black men. The predicted probabil even have competition in their subsequent elections. At ity of a council having any black women is about 13%, and large is always competitive. Very tough races, to be truth the expected proportion of black women is about 1.6% ful and we have only one woman and three men." Three regardless of the electoral system. The probability of a other council members all argued, however, that it was a council having any black men is much higher, about 53% toss-up and/or that the election of women depended on factors specific to each electoral contest, not the electoral 19We chose not to select cities on the combined basis of race and system. Councilwoman Sanders of Indianapolis stated, gender (e.g., only including cities with a substantial population of "I don't know that there's really much difference [be black women) because previous scholarship has indicated that race is a more important predictor of vote choice than gender. Thus we tween at-large versus district elections], at least not in my assume that the presence of black men and Latinos are important experience." for the election of black women and Latinas. This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jaon Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 98 562 JESSICA TROUNSTINE AND MELODYE. VALDINI Table 2 Tobit Regression on the Percentage of Council Members of Color by Gender % Black Women % Black Men > Latinas % Latinos % White Women Coefficient St Er Coefficient St Er Coefficient St Er Coefficient St Er Coefficient St Er % District -0.00 0.03 0.08* 0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01 Demographics % Latino 0.29 0.28 0.08 0.15 0.97* 0.27 1.63** 0.15 -0.15** 0.05 % Black 0.54* 0.1 0.58* 0.05 0.67* 0.33 0.27 0.19 -0.08** 0.04 % Asian 1.36* 0.63 -0.03 0.36 0.43 0.6 0.21 0.36 -0.09 0.13 % Women -0.19 0.57 0.49 0.31 -0.02 1.22 0.58 0.78 -0.36* 0.19 Total Pop (mil) -0.06 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.13 -0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05 % Poor 0.01 0.36 0.42* 0.19 0.67 0.6 0.25 0.36 -0.03 0.07 Med. Income (ths) -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00* 0.00 % Coll. Grad 0.42* 0.23 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.54 0.13 0.32 0.19** 0.05 % Noncitizens -0.61 0.64 -0.07 0.34 -0.7 0.46 -1.21** 0.26 0.00 0.14 % Pop Over 18 -0.09 0.45 -0.07 0.24 0.25 0.79 0.17 0.47 0.32** 0.09 Democratic Vote -0.03 0.15 -0.20* 0.08 -0.35 0.35 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.03 Institutions Term Limits 0.12* 0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04** 0.02 Nonpartisan 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 Mayor Council -0.03 0.03 -0.03* 0.02 -0.13 0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.02* 0.01 Council Size 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01** 0.00 Concurrent 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 VRA -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.10 0.04 0.06 Geography Central City 0.12* 0.04 0.08* 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.10* 0.05 0.04* 0.01 West -0.14 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.12* 0.01 Northeast 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.12 0.19 -0.15 0.11 0.01 0.01 Midwest 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.15 0.20 -0.02 0.10 0.04* 0.01 Constant -0.35 0.55 -0.38 0.3 -1.44 1.03 -1.45** 0.63 -0.13 0.12 N 893 893 698 698 3563 Waldx2 62.12* 303.92* 30.31 321.97* 430.62** *p<.10,**p<.05. Source: United States Census of Governments 1986. in at-large councils and nearly 70% for district councils. under districts to 67% in at-large cities, with the expected The expected proportion goes from 8% in at-large cities proportion increasing from 12% to 13%. to 14% in districted cities. In sum, black men and white women are the only For Hispanics the story is different. The electoral groups in our analysis that are substantively and signif structure has no significant effect on the proportion of icantly affected by electoral institutions, and the biggest the council that is Latino or Latina. However, Latinos are benefit of the system appears to be increasing the prob much more likely to be represented on councils. The prob ability of having any black men or white women, rather ability of having any Latinos on the council is about 21% than the proportion. and the expected proportion about 3.5%, while the proba bility of having Latinas on the council is about 4% and the expected proportion less than 1%. Finally, in these results it appears that the positive effect of at-large elections is all Concentration of Population Matters going toward white women, although the coefficient does The reason that the electoral system may have a relatively not quite reach statistical significance. The probability of small overall effect for racial and ethnic minorities may a council having any white women increases from 64% This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 99  THE CONTEXT MATTERS 563 lie in population size and residential concentration of the The results in Table 3 are clear. Only when a group groups. We now look to see whether districts have a larger is concentrated will districts promote increased descrip effect if these factors are taken into consideration. As op tive representation on the council. For African Ameri posed to women, African American and Latino voters cans, the effect of districts goes from being negative at can be heavily concentrated. The theory that concentra very low levels of concentration to significantly positive tion drives the relationship between district elections and at high levels. Districts have the largest effect for cities representation of racial and ethnic minorities has a sub in the third quartile, where moving from an at-large sys stantial number of subscribers (Brace et al. 1988; David tem to a district system increases the estimated probabil son and Korbel 1981; Engstrom and McDonald 1982; ity of electing an African American council member by Mladenka 1989; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982). Yet there about 10 percentage points, from 14% to 24%. This is a have been few attempts to actually test this claim directly powerful effect compared to the first quartile, where dis (Sass 2000 is an exception). We use 1990 and 2000 census tricts decreased both the probability of having any African data on concentration in 331 metropolitan areas to do so American councilors (from 7% to 3%) and the expected here.20 proportion from .9% to .3%. When the isolation index Demographers rely on a variety of different measures is very high for African Americans the effect of districts of racial and ethnic concentration and segregation calcu becomes insignificant. This could indicate the decreased lated using demographic data collected at the census-tract importance of the electoral system when a group makes level (Massey and Dent?n 1988). One measure is the iso up a majority of the electorate. The size of the black pop lation index, which ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the ulation is most dominant in the first and fourth models, probability that group members will meet members of suggesting that African American council representation their own group in their census tract. A score of .6 for in cities at the two ends of the isolation spectrum is best African Americans means that the average African Amer predicted by the size of the minority group itself. ican lives in a census tract that is 60% black. This mea We repeated this analysis with the 1986 census data sure has the benefit of being sensitive to a group's size in using the proportion of black men and the proportion of addition to the distribution of the group throughout a black women as dependent variables. As expected the re community. It would be impossible to have a high isola sults hold systematically for the election of black men, but tion score unless a group composes a substantial portion not black women. For black men districts have a negative of the total community. Both factors are likely impor effect in the first quartile and an increasingly powerful tant for a group to transform membership into voting effect in the second through fourth quartiles. For black strength. women the electoral institution has no effect in the first In order to analyze the effect of concentration, we split through third quartiles, but districts are extremely pow our data into four samples based on the isolation index erful and positive in the fourth quartile. When blacks for each group and run the same tobit models presented compose a majority of a city's population, districts?not above for each quartile.21 We hypothesize that the benefits at-large elections?help black women. of district elections should be most likely if a group can As shown in the bottom half of Table 3, for Latinos, reasonably generate a voting majority in some neighbor the effect of the interaction between districts and con hoods. In other words we predict increasingly significant centration is even more striking. The effect of districts effects as the isolation index increases. The following anal is small and highly insignificant in the first and second yses are restricted to cities with nonzero populations of quartiles. The effect in the third quartile is substantial but African Americans and Latinos. We present only the vari not quite statistically significant. Unless Latinos are ex ables of interest, but the models include all of the controls tremely concentrated, districts make little difference for listed in Table 1. The full models are available from the representation. In the fourth quartile, the impact is large. authors. Districts increase the probability of electing Latinos to the council to 98% from 75% under at-large systems.22 The 20The census did not produce concentration data at the municipal predicted proportion of Latinos on the council increases ity level until 2000, and then only for large cities. To show the effects by more than 25 percentage points from 19% in at-large of concentration across time for as many cases as we can, we rely cities to 48% in district systems.23 on the MSA-level statistics, but because of the potential mismatch between MSA- and city-level concentration, we rerun the analysis using 2000 data at the city level for 596 cases. 22We could not run these models on Latinos and Latinas separately because of a lack of data. 21 We elected not to present an interaction model because the effect is nonlinear. We had enough data to estimate the effect in a split 23 Using city-level isolation measures from 2000 for large cities, the sample allowing the coefficients to vary. results are extremely similar though not exactly the same. For blacks This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 100 564 JESSICA TROUNSTINE AND MELODY E. VALDINI Table 3 Tobit Regression on Proportion of African American Council Members, Controlling for Concentration 0 < isolation < .25 .25 < isolation < .50 .50 < isolation < .75 .75 < isolation < 1 Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err % District -0.13* 0.05 0.04* 0.02 0.08* 0.02 0.06 0.04 % Black 3.15* 0.48 1.29* 0.08 1.22* 0.06 1.31* 0.10 VRA 0.14* 0.06 -0.03* 0.02 0.06* 0.03 -0.90 73.3 Constant -0.92 0.60 -0.05 0.22 0.13 0.26 1.44 0.68 N 1373 2247 2735 908 Waldx2 94.15* 680.00* 902.92* 383.65* Tobit Regression on Proportion of Latino Council Members, Controlling for Concentration 0 < isolation < .25 .25 < isolation < .50 .50 < isolation < .75 .75 < isolation < 1 Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err Coefficient St Err % District 0.03 0.11 -0.00 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.32** 0.16 % Latino 4.63** 0.94 1.53** 0.17 1.53** 0.15 2.14** 0.40 % Noncitizens -4.98** 1.67 -1.22** 0.35 -0.97** 0.23 -0.64 0.67 Constant -2.80 1.73 -0.35 0.48 -0.53 0.46 1.61 1.19 N 4542 1966 968 133 Waldx2 163.28* 241.99* 427.35* 198.88* *p< .10,**p<.05. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 1990 & 2000; International City/County Manager's Association (ICMA) surveys of 1986,1992,1996, and 2001. There are at least two reasons that the effect of districts This is precisely the conclusion drawn by one of our occurs only at the highest levels of isolation for Latinos. interviewees, Councilman Felix Arroyo, the first Latino First, Latinos have lower levels of turnout compared to elected to the Boston City Council. Councilman Arroyo their population proportions than African Americans or stated that he chose to run for an at-large seat rather than whites. This may indicate that Latinos need to be a larger the district seats also available because "it is very difficult share of the population before they can affect electoral to win if you are a person of color by district except for outcomes as a group. Secondly, these results may indicate two districts which are actually communities of colors." a lower level of polarized voting and bloc group voting Further, he explained that because of the demographics of until Latinos are highly concentrated and a large portion the city, the at-large seat was better for electing Latinos in of the population. It is plausible that ethnic group identity Boston, "because most of the Latino community is spread would be associated with a higher degree of segregation across the city, as well as the immigrant community and and a larger minority group presence. In general though, the progressive groups." For Arroyo, the lack of concen these data provide strong support for our hypothesis that tration of his primary constituency means that districts the benefit of single-member district elections for minor do not offer him the best opportunity for election. ity groups operates through patterns of concentration. Councilor Carol Boigon, a white woman serving on Furthermore, the negative results for African Americans the Denver City Council, also emphasized the power of in the first quartile of isolation suggest that underrepre district elections when groups are concentrated. She ex sented groups may fare better in at-large elections when plains: they are highly dispersed throughout the community. ... in a district seat... some of the ethnic con the effect of districts is negative in the first quartile, small and centrations have an opportunity to be repre insignificant in the second quartile, and increasingly positive in the sented _That's the advantage I see. We have two third and fourth quartiles. For Latinos the effect is negative in the first quartile, nearly zero in the second and fourth quartiles, and seats that could reliably elect a black council per very powerful in the third quartile. son, the 8th and 11th. And those of us who feel This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 101  THE CONTEXT MATTERS 565 that it's important to have diverse voices at the In no case does the electoral system bring a group to table and who are not black, you would say "Why representational parity, but in cities where there are very would you run from one of those seats then?" I large populations of African Americans and Latinos, there wouldn't. is virtually 100% probability of at least a single council member being African American or Latino. This suggests Councilwoman Boigon's point is clear: African American that African Americans and Latinos are breaking into the council members benefit electorally in areas of the city political system when they command a substantial voting that have large concentrations of black voters. bloc. In our interviews a number of councilors emphasized group size in combination with concentration in their dis cussion of the superiority of district for electing people Size of the Group Interacts of color. Councilman Jamie Isabel, an African American with Districts member on the Nashville City Council, explained that dis tricts are better because at-large systems "dilute the votes." We hypothesized that the effect of districts should inter Similarly, Councilor Susan Burgess, a white woman on the act with group size, being most effective when groups Charlotte City Council, stated that are moderately sized. Our use of the isolation variable in the previous section tested this indirectly, but because the ... the reason is because we have drawn our dis index combines concentration with group size, in this sec tricts to make sure we have minority represen tion we test this hypothesis directly by splitting our sample tation. Three [out of seven] of our districts are by the size of the underrepresented group.24 We divided majority-minority. And there's always a minor our data into three subsamples for African Americans and ity elected there. We have had difficulty electing Latinos. The first sample includes cities that have minority minorities at-large, even when they are extremely populations greater than zero, but less than the one-half qualified... We've had awesome African Ameri of the percentage that a council seat represents. The sec can candidates who have tried to go from districts ond sample includes cities with minority groups equal to to at-large and lost citywide. or larger than one-half of the percentage the council seat represents, but less than a majority of the population. The third sample includes cities where the group in question Councilperson Joanne Sanders, a white woman serving composes a majority of the population. in the Indianapolis council (which is consolidated with The results confirm our expectations. Districts mat the county), nearly repeated the sentiments of Council ter most for groups that are a moderate proportion of woman Burgess, stating that the population. For very small and very large groups the electoral system has no significant effect on representa tion in the models. Rather than present these as regres because of the demographics of the county, I think that the district level was better for peo sion results, we have included a graph of the benefit of districts compared to at-large systems for African Amer ple of color... we still have heavily black areas, in our communities, where it's easily a seventy icans and Latinos depending on the size of the black or Latino population. thirty Democrat district. So for people of color The results in Figure 1 suggest that districts have a that's much easier than trying to run county-wide much stronger effect for African Americans than Latinos, where some of the outlying areas are predomi as would be expected given the differences in concentra nantly white. Although, the black people who have run on the at-large ticket have been successful but tion and bloc voting between the groups. For both groups the only statistically significant differences between elec again you can tell by the numbers unfortunately they don't always glean the most amount of votes. toral systems occur when the group is moderately sized. 24 A single model including the interactions between districts, group Councilor Sanders's response hints at the presence of size, and dummy variables for subsamples also generated signifi racially polarized voting in Indianapolis. Other interview cant results. There is no significant difference between at-large and ees expressed similar sentiments. When asked why district systems when a group is very small; increasing the group population increases the proportion of minority group members black candidates had been unsuccessful in winning at and districts enhance this result. We present the split sample analysis large seats, Councilman Isabel ascribed the outcome to because the results are easier to interpret. polarization: This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 102 566 JESSICA TROUNSTINE AND MELODY E. VALDINI Figure 1 Estimated Benefit of Districts Compared to At-Large Elections by Group Population Size, 1986-2001 Probability of Having Any Black or Latino Councilors Predicted Proportion of Black and Latino Councilors African American Latino Tiny Population 1 Moderate Population I Majority Population Source: U.S. Census Bureau 1990 & 2000; International City/County Manager's Association (ICMA) surveys of 1986,1992, 1996, and 2001. I think whites have a reluctance to vote for African Latinos tended to divide their votes among a slate of can Americans. We're in the south, I think up north or didates and so "every time a Hispanic candidate would back where you are out west, there may be some run, they would be defeated." According to these coun differences. But I think here in the south whites re cil members, racially polarized voting continues to be a ally haven't come to the reality that African Amer significant factor in city council elections, and different icans can represent them well. groups are affected in different ways by these types of vote patterns. Similarly, Councilor Burgess suggested that "subtle racism" kept African Americans from winning citywide elections. A number of our interviewees also insinuated Conclusions that some groups formed more cohesive voting blocs than others. Councilor Rodriguez from Denver highlighted the One final possibility in explaining the benefit of districts benefits of districts for Latino candidates because of the for female and minority council membership is the at strategy of "single-shot[ting]" where voters pool votes traction of running in a district versus citywide election. in a multicandidate, at-large race for a single candidate. Districts might aid racial and ethnic minorities because She told us that the African American community used more traditionally underrepresented candidates choose this approach successfully to elect representatives whereas to run in district races. If the organizing, fundraising, This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 103 THE CONTEXT MATTERS 5^7 and campaign costs are substantially different between Brown, Clyde, Neil Heighberger, and Peter Shocket. 1993. districts and citywide races, this may well be a factor. Fur "Gender-Based Differences in Perceptions of Male and Fe male City Council Candidates." Women & Politics 13(1): 1? thermore, it remains to be explained why some cities elect 17. more women than others: it does not appear to make a Bullock, Charles, and Susan MacManus. 1990. "Structural Fea substantial difference whether women run in district or tures of Municipalities and the Incidence of Hispanic Coun at-large electoral systems. Nonetheless, we believe that we cilmembers." Social Science Quarterly 71(4): 665-81. have taken a step forward in explaining the effect of elec Bullock, Charles S., Ill, and Susan A. MacManus. 1991. "Munic toral systems on underrepresented groups. ipal Electoral Structure and the Election of Councilwomen." Journal of Politics 53(1): 75-89. By taking advantage of the institutional variation Bullock, Charles S., Ill, and Susan A. MacManus. 1993. "Testing across cities in the United States, we have gained a more Assumptions of the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test: An nuanced understanding of the representation of women Analysis of the Impact of Structures on Black Descriptive and racial and ethnic minorities. Single-member district Representation." American Politics Quarterly 21(3): 290-306. systems can increase diversity only when underrepre Cole, Leonard. 1974. "Electing Blacks to Municipal Office: sented groups are highly concentrated and compose mod Structural and Social Determinants." Urban Affairs Quar terly 10(1): 17-39. erate portions of the population. These factors are most Conover, Pamela. 1988. "The Role of Social Groups in Political important in an arena where polarized voting predomi Thinking." British Journal of Political Science 18(1): 51-96. nates and where groups leverage their population size to Darcy, Robert, and Charles Hadley. 1988. "Black Women in achieve descriptive representation. In addition, the effect Politics?The Puzzle of Success." Social Science Quarterly of the electoral system is not constant across all people 69(3): 629-45. of color, nor is it constant across both genders; race and Darcy, Robert, Charles D. Hadley, and Jason F. Kirksey. 1993. gender interact to produce different results. 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"Parliaments of, by, and for the People: Ex Quarterly 51(4): 869-94. cept for Women?" In Electoral Systems in Comparative Per spective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities, ed. Wilma Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy Dent?n. 1988. "The Dimensions Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman. Westport, CT: Greenwood, of Residential Concentration." Social Forces 67(2): 281-315. 15-30. Mailand, Richard, and Donley Studlar. 1996. "The Contagion of Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. "Gender Stereotypes and Vote Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Propor Choice." American Journal of Political Science 46(1): 20-34. tional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Nor way." Journal of Politics 58(3): 707-33. Sass, Tim R. 2000. "The Determinants of Hispanic Representa Matland, Richard E. 1995. "How the Electoral System Structure tion in Municipal Government." Southern Economic Journal Has Helped Women Close the Representation Gap." In Clos 66(3): 609-30. This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 105 THE CONTEXT MATTERS 569 Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., and William Mishler. 2005. "An Inte Vedlitz, Arnold, and Charles Johnson. 1982. "Community grated Model of Women's Representation." Journal of Politics Racial Concentration, Electoral Structure, and Minority 67(May): 407-28. Representation." Social Science Quarterly 63(4): 729-36. Taebel, Delbert. 1978. "Minority Representation on City Coun Welch, Susan. 1990. The Impact of At-Large Elections on the cils: Impact of Structure on Blacks and Hispanics." Social Representation of Blacks and Hispanics. Journal of Politics Science Quarterly 59(1): 142-52. 52: 1050-76. Tarn, Wendy K. 1995. "Asians?A Monolithic Voting Bloc?" Political Behavior 17: 223-49. Welch, Susan, and Albert Karnig. 1979. "Correlates of Female Office Holding in City Politics." Journal of Politics 41(2): T?te, Katherine. 2003. 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This content downloaded from 130.111.28.95 on Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:29:15 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Page 106  MEMORANDUM To: Portland Charter Commission From: Jim Katsiaficas Date: March 22, 2022 Re: Legal Issues – Charter Revision Question(s); Districting Questions At a recent Charter Commission Meeting, Commissioner O’Brien asked who decides whether and how to organize charter commission revisions into one or more ballot questions. The answer is that the Charter Commission determines this by majority vote. Title 30-A M.R.S. §2105(1)(A) provides “A. If the charter commission, in its final report under section 2103, subsection 5, recommends that the present charter continue in force with only minor modifications, those modifications may be submitted to the voters in as many separate questions as the commission finds practicable. The determination to submit the charter revision in separate questions under this paragraph and the number and content of these questions must be made by a majority of the charter commission.” Commissioners have asked how City Council districts currently are determined and what legal standards apply, and asked if increases in City Council district seats necessarily require an increase in School Board seats. Article II, Section 1 of the current Charter provides for the division of the City into five districts for purposes of all City elections: For the purpose of all elections the city, including its islands, shall be divided into five (5) districts to establish compact and contiguous districts of approximately equal population. The city council for voting purposes may by ordinance divide the election districts into voting districts. The number of both City Council and School Board district seats are based on this provision. Article II, Section 2 provides for election of one City councilor to “be elected from each of the five (5) districts heretofore provided for [in Article II, Section 1].” Article III, Section 1 provides for five School Board members to be elected from each of the five districts established under Article II, Section 1. ONE CANAL PLAZA, PO BOX 426 PORTLAND, ME 04112-0426 207.774.2635 FAX 207.871.8026 www.perkinsthompson.com {P1999664.1} Page 107 March 22, 2022 State law (30-A M.R.S. §2503) requires municipalities that have districts to reapportion their districts through enactment of a reapportionment ordinance by the municipal legislative body within one year after the Maine Legislature completes its reapportionment, which follows each decennial national census. In that reapportionment, “Each district must contain as nearly as possible the same number of inhabitants as determined according to the latest Federal Decennial Census, but districts may not differ in number of inhabitants by more than 10% of the inhabitants in the smallest district created.” This is the result of U.S. Supreme Court decisions requiring equal weighting of votes. The City Council, as Portland’s municipal legislative body, establishes district reapportionment by ordinance. The City currently is conducting its reapportionment, which must be completed by August 10, 2022, 90 days before the November election. As noted above, the City Charter establishes five districts for purposes of all City elections, and so this sets out the number of districts and district seats for both Council and School Board elections. Except for the current Charter, I know of no other legal requirement that the number of School Board district seats equal the number of City Council district seats. However, there is the practical issue of conducting City elections if there were differing numbers of Council and School Board districts, since there would be two different sets of districts with different boundaries. Election workers at polling places would have to offer multiple district ballots since Council and School Board district lines would not be the same. This already happens where State legislative district lines divide City districts, and would add another layer of complexity to City election management. Moreover, in discussing this with the School Board’s legal counsel, I understand that the School Board has not taken a position on the potential of increasing the number of district seats, but that the Superintendent believes the School Board’s general desire for greater diversity of representation and for parity with the City Council means that the School Board would want to increase the number of district seats accordingly. {P1999664.1} PERKINS THOMPSON PAGE 2 Page 108  CITY OF PORTLAND ETHICS COMMISSION & CODE OF ETHICS 1. The proper operation of the City of Portland requires that all City officials, whether elected, appointed, or city employees be impartial, equitable, and responsive to the needs of the people and each other in the performance of their respective functions and duties; that proper conduct by City officials will promote public confidence in the integrity of government and will be maintained by all City officials; that public office not be used for personal or financial gain or advantage; and that the structure of City government be used properly in decision and policy- making. In recognition of these goals and the importance of protecting public interest and City officials, a Ethics Commission shall hereby be established for all by the City Council. 1.1 PURPOSE: To provide impartial oversight as to ensure that standards of conduct are defined and upheld; and to make public the sources of income as well as other areas of personal and pecuniary interests to city officials, their family members, and major supporters for purposes of recusal. Section 1.2 Ordinance required. The City Council shall maintain an ordinance defining the code of ethical conduct of elected and appointed City officials, as well as all employees of the City in accordance with all applicable labor laws, contracts, and confidentiality requirements. The ordinance shall be developed and recommended by the Ethics Commission, as provided in Section 2, and be approved and later amended with the approval of 2/3 of City Councilors present and voting. The ordinance shall establish the process for filing complaints and soliciting advisory opinions by residents of Portland and city employees. 1.3 The code shall include and encompass but not be limited to the following: Standards of Conduct Disclosure of Confidential Information Conflicts of Interest Disclosure of Conflict Determination of Conflict 1.3.1 Whereby the disclosures as provided in Sec. 1.3 wherein prior to being sworn into office, all elected city officials and executive and senior city staff shall complete a disclosure form. The form shall disclose all sources of income, as well as those of close family members, in accordance with common and accepted practices consistent with state and community standards. Applicable forms shall be public documents and may be referenced by the public for purposes of recusal. The form shall be updated on an annual basis or upon change of employment or situation. These disclosures shall be made publically accessible and posted Page 109 together on the city’s website and on the page of that city official as applicable and in accordance with all applicable labor laws, contracts, and confidentiality requirements. 1.4 The Board shall devise, with the assistance from city staff and/or outside counsel, a code of ethics for Portland City officials and employees which shall include but be not limited to: - Councilors - School Board - All other elected officials - All appointments including but not limited to boards, commissions, and task forces - All city employees 1.5 Anyone, whether they be a city official or member of the public, may bring a complaint to the attention of city officials for the purposes of consideration of a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, or for any violation of the code of ethical conduct. Section 2. Formation of Ethics Commission. The ordinance shall direct the formation of an Ethics Commission, consisting of seven (7) members who are residents of the City, to review the code ordinance not less than once every three (3) years. The commission shall be appointed by the City Council. Elected officials, candidates for any elected office, and their immediate family members shall not be permitted to be members of the commission. The commission shall meet as needed, but no less than once every three (3) months. Section 2.1. Independence. The Commission shall remain an independent body, free from interference from any City employees or elected officials. The Commission may request funding from the City Council for an independent investigation as needed. Section 2.2. Term. Commissioners shall serve for a term of three (3) years. Section 2.3 Duties. The Commission shall develop the Code of Ethics. The Commission shall provide a report to the City Council no less than annually. The Commission shall consider questions and render advisory opinions. Page 110 Section 2.3.1. Advisory Opinions. The Ethics Commission or quorum of at least five (5) members, shall be convened on request for an advisory opinion by no less than two (2) members of the City Council, the Mayor, or the Chief Executive of the City. The Commission may issue, at its discretion, advisory opinions upon request of any city officer, official, employee, or resident of the City of Portland at any time. The names of complainants shall be protected by confidentiality, unless they elect to waive it. No complainant shall be retaliated against for filing a complaint. Section 2.3.2. Advisory Interpretation of the City Charter The Ethics Commission may, at its discretion, also render non- binding, advisory opinions on City compliance with The City Charter. The Commission shall provide its written interpretation of the Charter on the written request of any resident or official of the City. The Commission’s interpretation is advisory only and for educational purposes and shall not be the basis for any legal action. A copy of the request and the proposed response shall be provided to the City Council, Mayor and City Manager for review prior to being issued. Section 2.3.3. The Ethics Commission shall deliver all advisory opinions including but not limited to ethics violations, conflicts of interest, and charter opinions, to the City Attorney, Chief Executive/Administrator, Mayor and City Council in compliance with applicable law, no less than 14 days after a decision is made. AND PUBLIC REVIEW?? Section 3. Violations of Ethics Code. Violations apply to both elected and appointed officials and any member of city staff. If the Commission finds violations of the ethics code, the Commission may recommend, by a simple majority vote, advisory opinions to the applicable hiring authority any appropriate disciplinary or removal proceedings and notify the city attorney that further action should be taken in accordance with state law. Opinions rendered by the Commission are not legally binding and purely advisory in nature and shall be Page 111 rendered in accordance with all applicable labor laws, contracts, and confidentiality requirements.. In no circumstances shall the ethics commission have access to any personal information protected by state law. Any City Councilor or Mayor found in violation of the ethics code may be reprimanded by the City Council. The Council may decide to do nothing, censure a member, remove a member, or set a recall election. Whichever option is selected, requires a 2/3rds majority vote of the City Council. Suspected criminal conduct shall be reported immediately to the Portland police department. The complainant shall receive a response to the complaint regarding the outcome. Section 3.1 Conflict of Interest of Elected Officials, Boards, and ad hoc Committees 3.1.1 Determination of Conflict If the subject is a member of an elected or appointed body, including but not limited to council, board, committee, or task force, the complaint shall be brought to the attention of the chair (or equivalent) of that body. Once the complaint of conflict of interest has been initiated against a member of a body as provided above, the body shall deliberate the matter themselves or refer deliberation to an appropriate office or entity. If the complaint is against the chair, then the complaint shall be brought to the attention of the next most senior member who is not subject of the complaint or who is not the complainant themself. Once a complaint has been made, the subject shall be notified of the complaint and shall have the option to recuse themself or to request deliberation. Public notice shall be given of the complaint unless confidentiality requirements prohibit it. Complaints determined by the chair of the relevant body (or the next most senior member, to whom the complaint is not against) to be frivolous, scurrilous, libelous, baseless, unfounded, of nuisance, or otherwise without account need not be deliberated or referred if the complaint is publicly designated as such. Page 112 Members of the public may bring their complaint to the entire body or to other city officials including the Ethics Commission. The Commission may refer complaints to the appropriate office or body for consideration. Except as described in the preceding paragraph, all complaints shall be considered or deliberated in as timely manner as possible and in any case shall be considered in advance of deliberation on the relevant proposal or law. Section 3.2 Acknowledgement of Complaint The complainant shall receive a response to the complaint regarding the outcome. Section 3.3 Failure to Disclose or Comply with Code of Ethics Failure to disclose or comply with the code of ethics shall result in disciplinary action that may include termination of the individual from their position with the city. Examples of Ethics Boards/Commissions/Ordinances/Charter Amendments: Bangor, ME: Population: 31,753 ● Ordinance: https://ecode360.com/6889057 ● Charter Amendment (establishes board & requires creation of code): https://ecode360.com/14956369 Waterville, ME: Population: 15,828 ● Ordinance:http://www.waterville-me.gov/ordinances/wp- content/uploads/sites/25/2018/02/Ethics-Ordinance-Revised-010518.pdf ● Charter Amendment: Article VI (establishes board & requires creation of code) http://www.waterville-me.gov/clerk/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2017/08/2020-Charter- with-Revision-Markups.pdf Windham, ME: Population: 18,434 ● Ordinance (establishes both the Ethics Board & code): https://www.windhammaine.us/DocumentCenter/View/1017/Ethics-Policy---Board-of- Ethics?bidId= York, ME: Population 13,723 ● Ordinance (no board established - up to chairs & department heads to regulate conduct): https://www.yorkmaine.org/DocumentCenter/View/1348/a-Code-of-Ethics-2021-06- 14?bidId= Bristol, ME: Population 2,834 ● Ordinance (no board established but complaints are brought straight to the selectmen to decide). Page 113  https://www.bristolmaine.org/sites/g/files/vyhlif4191/f/uploads/code_of_ethics_and_cond uct.pdf Lisbon, ME: Population 9,711 ● Ordinance (establishes an ethics panel of three voters and issues advisory opinions on conflicts of interests) https://library.municode.com/me/lisbon/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICOOR_C H12ETCOIN_S12-3ETPA Ogunquit, ME: Population 1,577 ● Ordinance (no board, ethics violations are determined internally on boards and committees) https://www.townofogunquit.org/vertical/Sites/%7B2524508A-BBA7- 433A-9EAA- E74D93FCB25D%7D/uploads/CODE_OF_ETHICS_FOR_BOARDS_AND_COMMIT TEES.pdf Madison, ME: Population 2,433 ● Ordinance (includes ethics board with advisory opinions provided to select board) https://ecode360.com/9856843 Kennebunk, ME: Population 11,536 ● Internal procedures governing rules for the council. https://www.kennebunkmaine.us/DocumentCenter/View/218/Select-Board-Code-of- Ethics?bidId= Bridgton, ME: Population 5,418 ● Ordinance (establishes penalty for violation and applies to all elected officials and employees) https://bridgtonmaine.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Code-of-Ethics.pdf New York, NY: Population: 8.5 Million ● Charter Chapter 68 (establishes the Conflicts of Interest Board, defines its powers and obligations, defines prohibited interests and conduct, establishes reporting requirements, establishes the Board’s power to impose penalties, authorizes the Board to investigate and adjudicate gifts by lobbyists): https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCcharter/0-0-0-5995 ● The Rules of the City of New York https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/newyorkcity/latest/NYCrules/0-0-0-86448 El Paso, TX: Population: 679,813 Page 114  ● Charter Title 2, Chapter 2.92 (establishes board, Standard of Conduct, duties, jurisdiction, and procedures) https://library.municode.com/tx/el_paso/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT2ADPE_ CH2.92ET_ARTIIIETRECO_2.92.150ADOP ● Ordinance https://library.municode.com/tx/el_paso/ordinances/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=107821 4 Philadelphia, PA: Population 1.58 Million ● Charter Chapter 11 (establishes Board, powers and duties) https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-182492 ● Code (defines duties, standards, prohibited conduct, penalties, establishes standard of conduct and financial disclosure requirements) https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-217009 Examples of Charter Compliance Commissions: Provincetown, MA: Population: 2,994 - Charter Compliance Commission ● Charter Amendment: https://www.provincetown-ma.gov/125/Charter-Compliance- Commission ● https://www.provincetown-ma.gov/DocumentCenter/View/202/Charter-PDF?bidId= (page 6) Bourne, MA: Population: 19,872 - Charter Compliance Commission ● Charter Amendment: https://www.townofbourne.com/sites/g/files/vyhlif7346/f/uploads/town_charter_2016.pdf ● https://www.townofbourne.com/charter-compliance Milton, VT: Population 2,507 - Charter Compliance Commission ● Charter Amendment: https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/24appendix/129/00702 Reasoning: 1. Protect whistleblowers. 2. Fight and discourage corruption, waste, fraud, abuse, and favoritism from both elected and unelected individuals. 3. Increase transparency and accountability in municipal government. Page 115 4. Be a safe, independent place to send complaints and concerns regarding ethical conduct. 5. Creates an ethics mission and code for the City of Portland. 6. Cost effective, productive ethical conduct oversight. 7. To bring more voices at the table and the community oriented decisions on what ethical conduct is, rather than one individual. 8. Build public trust in municipal government 9. No associated costs chartered in. Page 116 Procedures Committee Proposal on Participatory Budgeting "The City Council shall develop and implement a participatory budgeting system wherein a portion of the municipal budget and/or the Capital Improvement program is allocated based on a process that involves the input of as many residents of Portland as possible. The City Council may establish a subcommittee, a task force, or any other structure that is necessary and proper for the design, implementation, and management of a participatory budgeting system." Page 117 Page 118 SCHOOL BUDGET Section 5. School budget. Prior to the submission of a school budget, the school board and city council shall establish a Joint Committee on Budget Guidance, consisting of with four city councilors and four school board members, appointed by the Mayor and school board chair, respectively. The purpose of the joint committee is to develop guidance for the city and school district on budget priorities and constraints, covering a two-year period and updated annually. The joint committee shall obtain public comment on the guidance prior to submitting the guidance as a proposed non-binding joint resolution to the city council and school board for their approval. Not later than three and one-half (3.5) months before the end of the fiscal year, the superintendent shall submit to the school board budget estimates of the various sums required for the support of public schools for the ensuing fiscal year and shall thereafter provide the school board with such information relating to such estimates as the school board shall require. During the thirty (30) days fFollowing submission of the superintendent’s proposed budget to the school board and the city budget to the city council, the school board and the city council, or their designated subcommittees, a Joint Budget Committee, consisting of four city councilors and four school board members, appointed by the Mayor and school board chair, respectively, shall meet jointly at least twice to review the proposed school budget, focusing on its underlying assumptions and supporting data and the ability of the city to raise the necessary funds for the support of such proposed budget develop guidance for the city and school district on budget priorities and constraints for the upcoming fiscal year. The joint committee shall obtain public comment on the guidance prior to submitting the guidance to the city council and school board for their consideration. The superintendent and the city manager shall provide budget information regarding such proposed budget as reasonably requested by the Joint Budget Committeeschool board and the city council, or their designated subcommittees. Page 119 The budget submitted by the superintendent to be reviewed jointly by the school board and the city council shall provide a complete financial plan of all school funds and activities for the ensuing fiscal year. In organizing the school budget for joint review by the school board, the superintendent shall utilize the most feasible combination of expenditure classification by fund, organization, unit, program, purpose or activity, and object. The budget shall begin with a clear general summary of its contents; shall show in detail all estimated income and all proposed expenditures, including debt service for the ensuing fiscal year; and shall be so arranged as to show comparative figures for actual and estimated income and expenditures of the current fiscal year and actual income and expenditures of the preceding fiscal year. The total of proposed expenditures shall not exceed the total of proposed income. Not later than the last Monday in April of each fiscal year, the school board shall submit to the city councilprepare a budget of the various sums required for the support of the public schools for the ensuing fiscal year in the format provided above, and shall thereafter provide the city council with such information relating to such budget as the city council shall require. The school board shall hold aA budget hearing on such budget estimates shall be held at least seven (7) days prior to determining the total amount of the school budgetfinal action by the city council. The city council shall thereafter submit the school budget determined by the school board to a budget validation referendum. If the voters discontinue use of the budget validation referendum process, the city council shall instead submit the school budget to a municipal school budget referendum. The warrant calling the budget validation referendum or the school budget referendum shall include voter information containing the amount of locally raised funds and the amounts for each cost center summary budget category proposed by the school board. The city council in its appropriation resolve for the ensuing year shall, in addition to amounts appropriated for other general city purposes, appropriate one gross amount for the Page 120 support of the public schools, which amount shall equal the greater of (i) the amount adopted by the voters at the school budget referendum and ratified at the budget validation referendum, as necessary, or (ii)not be less than the sum required to be appropriated for such purposes by the general laws of the state. Such gross amount shall not be less than the sum requested by the school board except by a vote of at least six (6) members of the city council. Such appropriation shall be expended under the direction and control of the school board but no such appropriation shall be exceeded except by consent of the voters city council. (Referendum 6/13/78; 11/2/10) Page 121 At the appropriate location(s) in the Charter, specify that the city manager and superintendent must jointly prepare and submit to a joint meeting of the council and school board a multi-year capital improvement CIP before submission of the budget, and must publish a general summary of the CIP. The CIP must be revised and extended each year with regard to capital improvements pending or in process of construction or acquisition. The Education Committee recognizes that changes in the city’s governance structure may affect the roles of city officials in the CIP process. If no changes are made to the governance structure, the following amendments to the Charter appear to capture the intent of this proposal: ARTICLE VI. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS … Section 5. Appointment; qualifications; powers and duties of the city manager. … The city manager's powers and duties shall be as follows: … (i) To jointly prepare with the Portland Public Schools superintendent a five (5) year rolling capital improvement plan for annual presentation to a joint meeting of the city council and school board, which plan includes the following: 1. A one (1) year plan of specific projects and their cost; 2. A two (2) through five (5) year plan of specific projects and general categories, and amounts of proposed spending and funding sources; and 3. A discussion of the basis for the plan and the factors which went into its development or amendments. Page 122  GOVERNANCE COMPROMISE (AMENDMENT) Co-Sponsors: Commissioners CHANN and O’BRIEN amended by BUXTON, KEBEDE, SHEIKH- YOUSEF, and WASHBURN MAYOR AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE  The mayor shall be the chief executive officer of the City of Portland, overseeing and supervising the city administrator and implementing policies passed by the City Council.  The mayor is no longer a member of the Council and does not have a council vote. COUNCIL AS LEGISLATIVE BRANCH  Councilors shall together form an Executive Committee, which appoints members to committees and elects a 2-year council president.  The council president develops and proposes council rules of procedure for adoption by the council.  The council president serves as the official channel for Council to communicate with constitutional officers about policies, priorities, and agendas for Council meetings.  The mayor may propose legislation to be taken up by council. Individual council members may sponsor legislation. All city staff and members of the public may petition a councilor to sponsor legislation to be taken up on their behalf. PUBLIC FIGUREHEAD  The mayor shall serve as the official representative of the city in Augusta and Washington, D.C.  The mayor shall serve as the official spokesperson for the city.  The mayor may form public task forces with staffing support for any issue not taken up by the council. BUDGETARY POWERS  The mayor, with the assistance of department heads and the city administrator, drafts and presents the annual city budget to the council for adoption.  The mayor, with the assistance of the city administrator, works with department heads to develop their departmental budgets. REMOVAL OF MAYOR  If the mayor is convicted of a felony materially related to their official duties, the City Council may, upon a vote of ¾ of its members, remove the mayor from their office.  If the mayor engages in official misconduct or neglect of duty, the council may schedule a recall election by a 3/4ths vote. (from Westbrook) APPOINTMENTS AND STAFFING  The mayor may not unilaterally hire and fire city staff, including the city administrator, city attorney, city clerk, and department heads.  The mayor nominates department heads and the city administrator, and presents nominations to the City Council for confirmation. Page 123   Only department heads may fire and hire city staff.  The council cannot unilaterally fire or hire officers, including the city administrator or department heads. The mayor shall recommend removal of an officer, and the council can approve with simple majority. If council seeks to discharge an officer, they should seek approval of the mayor, who will make the recommendation for removal to be approved by a majority of the council. Should the council seek to remove an officer without mayoral approval, they may only do so with a ¾ majority vote. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS  The mayor oversees the implementation of policies passed by the council and shall meet regularly with the Council Executive Committee to develop implementation plans and report on results and measure accountability.  The mayor shall direct the city administrator and department heads to implement council policies.  The mayor shall lead an economic development task force.  The mayor shall chair the city administrator’s annual performance review and may call, at any time, an executive session of the council to discuss performance. Page 124  [CHANGES TRACKED] GOVERNANCE COMPROMISE Co-Sponsors: Commissioners CHANN and O’BRIEN amended by KEBEDE, BUXTON, SHEIKH- YUSUF, and WASHBURN MAYOR AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE ● The mayor shall be the chief executive officer of the City of Portland, overseeing and supervising the City Manager city administrator and implementing policies passed by the City Council. ● The mayor is no longer a member of the Council and does not have a vote. ● The mayor signs or vetos all legislation enacted by the Council. Commented [1]: Veto power was not in ● The mayor shall preside as chair of a twelve (12) member council. original document Michael sent. I think the veto powers significantly alters the powers of ● The mayor shall cast a vote only in the event of a tie. the mayor and makes this **much** less of a ● The mayor and At-Large Councilors shall together form an Executive Committee, who will compromise proposal than Michael's original appoint Council members to committees. text. I'm still not sure where I land on veto power, but I think if the goal is still to ● The Executive Committee will develop and propose Council rules of procedure for adoption by encourage some council-mayor the City Council. collaboration, it might be better to allow Mayor to sponsor legislation (and spell this ● The Executive Committee will serve as the official channel for the mayor and Council to out in detail in this proposal) and form communicate with Constitutional Officers about policies, priorities, and to set agendas for legislative tasks force, rather than give mayor Council meetings. veto power. If the mayor doesn't have veto power and instead needs to collaborate w/ COUNCIL AS LEGISLATIVE BRANCH councilors to push their agenda, is that more collaborative? I don't think their lack of a veto ● Councilors shall together form an Executive Committee, which appoints members to committees makes them any less "accountable" to voters, and elects a 2-year council president. we've just seen veto power abused pretty ● The council president develops and proposes council rules of procedure for adoption by the extensively in Maine, especially with such a council. split electorate. ● The council president serves as the official channel for Council to communicate with Either way-- I think veto power is up for constitutional officers about policies, priorities, and agendas for Council meetings. debate and I think we should hash it out as commission. I don't know if i can sign on to ● CB added: The mayor may propose legislation to be taken up by council. Individual council something with veto power for the mayor. members may sponsor legislation. All city staff and members of the public may petition a Commented [2]: Is this a Committee of the councilor to sponsor legislation to be taken up on their behalf. Whole or do councilors elect a few of their members as executives? Commented [3R3]: Similar question: I think the PUBLIC FIGUREHEAD WHOLE council should elect the whole of their executive committee-- so they all vote ● The mayor shall serve as the official representative of the city in Augusta and Washington, D.C. on their president and 2(?) other committee ● The mayor shall serve as the official spokesperson for the city. members to serve on Exec. ● The mayor may form public task forces by right with staffing support for any issue not taken up broader q is do they need an exec committee by the council. or is it better just to have 1 CP? BUDGETARY POWERS Commented [4]: this was a common thread b/tw Gov Committee and NSY proposal. ● The mayor, with the assistance of department heads and the city administrator, drafts and presents the annual city budget to the council for adoption. Page 125  ● The mayor, with the assistance of the shall direct the drafting of the City Budget by the City Manager, who will work withand city administrator, shall works with department heads to develop their departmental budgets. REMOVAL OF MAYOR ● If the mayor is convicted of a felony materially related to their the performance of the Mayor’s official duties, the City Council may, upon a vote of ¾ of its members, remove the mayor from their office. ● If the mayor engages in official misconduct or neglect of duty, the council may schedule a recall election by a 3/4ths vote. (from Westbrook) APPOINTMENTS AND STAFFING ● The mayor may not unilaterally hire and fire city staff, including the City Managercity administrator, city attorney, city clerk, and department heads. ● The mayor advises and consents to City Manager’s shall nominatesions department heads and the city administrator, and presents nominations to the City Council for confirmation. ● Only department heads may fire and hire city staff. ● The city council may not unilaterally discharge department heads or the city administrator. These Commented [5]: I'm not sure I'm 100% behind individuals Department heads/City Administrator may only be fired if the Mayor recommends this addition, I think it makes sense for the council to not be able to fire a mayor's staff such action and a majority of the council approves. The council cannot unilaterally fire or hire out from under them, but at the same officers, including city administrator or department heads. The mayor shall recommend to remove time...what if a mayor hires someone who an officer, council can approve with simple majority. If council seeks to discharge an officer, they turns out to be a real dumpster fire of a person, but they won't fire them because should seek approval of mayor, who will make the recommendation for removal to be approved they're a personal friend, you'd want a check by majority of council. Should the council seek to remove an officer without mayoral approval, on that thru the council, right?) they may only do so with a ¾ majority vote. Does it make more sense that the mayor can ● nom, hire, fire w/ a vote of 2/3rds of council, and council likewise can by 2/3 or even POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND DAY-TO-DAY larger majority opt to remove a high level OPERATIONS staffer? It offers a balance on power and ● The mayor oversees the implementation of policies passed by the council and shall meet regularly addresses sone folks concerns about with the Council Executive Committee to develop a plan for implementation plans and report on cronyism better. results. to help ensure and measure accountability. Commented [6]: This section feels a little convoluted. Does it make sense to say more ● The mayor shall direct the city administrator and department heads City Manager to implement simply: council policies. "Mayor may hire and fire department heads and the city administrator with nomination ● The mayor shall lead an economic development task force. and approval for any new hires or discharges ● The mayor shall chair the City Managercity administrator’s annual performance review and may with a 2/3 council vote? Department heads call, at any time, an executive session of the council to discuss performance. are responsible for hiring and firing of their own staffers." Page 126  GOVERNANCE COMPROMISE Co-Sponsors: Commissioners CHANN and O’BRIEN MAYOR AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE ● The Mayor shall be the chief executive officer of the City of Portland with supervision of the City Manager and the implementation of policies passed by the City Council. ● The Mayor shall preside as chair of the City Council. ● The Mayor shall cast a vote only in the event of a tie. ● The Mayor and At-Large Councilors shall together form an Executive Committee, who will appoint Council members to committees. ● The Executive Committee will develop and propose Council rules of procedure for adoption by the City Council. ● The Executive Committee will serve as the official channel for the Mayor and Council to communicate with Constitutional Officers about policies, priorities, and to set agendas for Council meetings. PUBLIC FIGUREHEAD ● Mayor shall serve as the official representative of the City in Augusta and Washington, D.C. ● Mayor shall serve as the official spokesperson for the City. ● May form public task force by right with reasonable staffing support for any issue not taken up by Council. BUDGETARY POWERS ● The Mayor shall present the City Budget to the Council for adoption. ● The Mayor shall communicate their and City Council’s priorities for the drafting of the City Budget by the City Manager, who will work with Department Heads to develop their departmental budgets. ● The Mayor may veto the City Budget and the Council can override with a 2/3 majority vote. HIRING & FIRING OF CITY STAFF ● The City Manager, Corporation Counsel, and City Clerk shall be hired following a search process that includes the Mayor and City Council and a majority vote of the City Council. ● The Mayor shall chair the City Manager, Corporation Counsel, and City Clerk’s annual performance review and may call, at any time, an executive session of the Council to discuss performance. These officers may be removed following a majority vote of the City Council. ● The Mayor shall not have the power to unilaterally hire and fire city staff, including the City Manager, City Attorney, City Clerk, Department Heads. ● The Mayor advises and consents to City Manager’s nominations of Department Heads and presents to City Council for confirmation. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, ECONOMIC DEV & DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS ● The Mayor shall ensure that policies passed by the Council are implemented by the City Manager and city staff and shall meet regularly with the Executive Committee and the City Manager to develop a plan for implementation to help ensure and measure accountability. ● The Mayor shall lead an economic development task force. Page 127